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SHIFTING BURDENS: DISCRIMINATION 
LAW THROUGH THE LENS OF JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Catherine T. Struve*
Abstract: This Term, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the U.S. Su-
preme Court held the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework inappli-
cable to Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims. This 
Article finds the Gross Court’s rationales for repudiating Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins unpersuasive. Although the crux of the Court’s argument is that 
it is too confusing to instruct a jury on the burden-shifting framework, in 
actuality, there is no evidence that burden-shifting instructions are unduly 
confusing. In fact, Gross will exacerbate a different sort of confusion: that 
which arises when a jury must resolve two claims under different burden 
frameworks. At best, then, the Gross Court’s concerns over judicial ad-
ministration are a wash. They fail to justify the Court’s departure from the 
20-year-old Price Waterhouse precedent. The Article therefore considers the 
possibility that the Court’s decision in Gross was driven by policy views 
about the nature and merit of ADEA claims, or of employment discrimi-
nation claims more generally. By shifting the balance in ADEA and per-
haps other employment discrimination cases without articulating a per-
suasive reason for doing so, the Court may have laid the groundwork for 
Congress to revisit the question—thus opening the way for a more explic-
itly policy-based overhaul of the burden frameworks. 
Introduction 
 Under the framework set by the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, an employment discrimination plaintiff bears the burden of prov-
ing that discrimination was the determinative factor in the challenged 
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employment decision.1 But under an alternative framework that bur-
den can shift: in 1989 a fractured Supreme Court held that upon a 
showing that the plaintiff’s protected status (such as sex) played a moti-
vating (or substantial) part in the employer’s adverse action, the bur-
den would shift to the employer to prove that it would have made the 
same decision even if the plaintiff had not had that protected status 
(e.g., even if the plaintiff had not been a woman).2 Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins—the case in which the Court adopted this test—was seen as a 
double edged sword: on one hand, plaintiffs’ advocates liked the idea 
of shifting the burden to the defendant to prove the same-decision de-
fense, but on the other, they criticized the decision for immunizing 
some employment decisions in which discrimination was found to have 
played a role. 
 Price Waterhouse came to be grouped with a number of other Su-
preme Court decisions—all viewed as too defendant-friendly—to which 
Congress responded in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“the 1991 Act”).3 
The 1991 Act adopted the Price Waterhouse framework but modified it by 
making the same-decision defense relevant to remedies rather than to 
liability. 4  Congress added a provision, now codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m), stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this sub-
chapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice.” 5  Congress also 
amended Title VII’s enforcement framework by adding a provision, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), that sets a limit on reme-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981); McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 
2 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion). In the 
interests of brevity, the description at this point in the text glosses over divisions among the 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins plurality and the concurrences of Justices O’Connor and White. 
For the term “motivating part,” see id. at 244, 258. For the term “substantial factor,” see id. 
at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). For a discussion of the justices’ internal debates over these terms, see infra 
notes 121–139 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s reference to 
“direct evidence,” see infra notes 143–149. 
3 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 29, 42 U.S.C.). The 1991 Act listed as one of its purposes “to re-
spond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil 
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” Id. 
§ 3 (set forth as a note following 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)). 
4 See id. § 107(a), § 703(m). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
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dies.6 Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) states that “[o]n a claim in which an 
individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and 
a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” the 
court may grant declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attor-
ney’s fees and costs attributable to the § 2000e-2(m) claim, but “shall 
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, rein-
statement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph 
(A).”7 In sum, a motivating-factor showing under § 2000e-2(m) estab-
lishes liability, while a same-decision showing by the defendant under 
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the plaintiff’s remedies.8
 Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act left questions in their wake. 
Should either the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting or the statutory bur-
den-shifting framework apply outside the context of Title VII discrimi-
nation claims? Although a number of courts concluded that Price Water-
house did apply to other discrimination (and retaliation) claims, courts 
generally viewed §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) as more re-
stricted in their reach.9 And assuming that either the statutory or the 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting scheme was available for a particular 
type of claim, what sort of showing was necessary to qualify a case for a 
burden-shifting instruction? Relying on Justice O’Connor’s concur-
rence in the judgment in Price Waterhouse, some courts restricted mixed-
motive burden-shifting to cases featuring “direct evidence” of a dis-
criminatory motive.10 This distinction was heavily criticized, however, 
and in the 2003 Desert Palace v. Costa decision the Supreme Court held 
that under §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) the “motivating fac-
tor” showing could be made by either direct or circumstantial evi-
dence.11
 Because the Desert Palace holding addressed only the statutory 
mixed-motive framework, it left unclear whether the same approach 
should apply under the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive framework that 
courts applied to claims other than Title VII discrimination claims. 
Onlookers expected the Court to tackle this issue when it granted the 
                                                                                                                      
6 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
7 Id. 
8 See id. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
9 See McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1998) (“By 1991, 
our circuit and courts across the country had begun to adopt the Price Waterhouse approach 
in all mixed-motive discrimination cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 rolled back the Price 
Waterhouse holding in certain types of discrimination claims.” (citation omitted)). 
10 See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
11 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003). 
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petition for certiorari in Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., an Age Dis-
crimination in Employment (“ADEA”) case that presented the ques-
tion, “Must a plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination in or-
der to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimina-
tion case?”12 Instead, a narrow majority of the justices opted to moot 
the question by holding that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is unavail-
able for ADEA claims.13
 Part I of this Article argues that the rationales adduced in Gross are 
problematic.14 One of those rationales is implausible, and the others all 
depend, for their persuasiveness, on the Gross Court’s effort to discredit 
Price Waterhouse. But the only reason explicitly cited in Gross for depart-
ing from Price Waterhouse is that burden-shifting jury instructions are too 
difficult to administer.15 On its face, Gross seems to argue that burden-
shifting instructions are inherently confusing; but the Court fails to 
support that assertion. The Court could have raised two other argu-
ments concerning confusion, each of which is more serious.16 First, 
confusion over the applicability of the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting 
instruction has been rampant.17 Gross resolved this confusion for ADEA 
claims by holding that burden-shifting is never available.18 This deci-
sion was an effective choice for eliminating this type of confusion, but it 
was not the only possible choice. Second, confusion will continue to 
arise for juries faced with the task of adjudicating multiple claims to 
which different burden frameworks apply. Gross if anything exacerbates 
this confusion. 
 In sum, Part I argues that the confusion arguments are at best a 
wash—which makes them a dubious basis for the Gross Court’s decision 
to reject the 20-year-old Price Waterhouse precedent.19 Part II, searching 
for some better explanation, considers the possibility that the decision 
to reject burden-shifting in Gross reflects underlying views concerning 
policy and practice in age discrimination litigation, or in discrimination 
                                                                                                                      
12 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 
(2009) (No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099. 
13 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351. 
14 See infra notes 23–301 and accompanying text. 
15 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
16 See Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 Penn. St. L. Rev. 857, 884 (2010) (noting that 
“[t]here is nothing . . . difficult” about the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework, 
and that “[w]hat has been difficult about the burden-shifting framework has been figuring 
out when to apply it”). 
17 That is to say, there is confusion over what factual circumstances will trigger a bur-
den shift in those types of cases that permit burden shifting. 
18 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
19 See infra notes 23–301 and accompanying text. 
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litigation more generally.20 If such views did drive the decision, they 
operated under the surface of the opinion. For that reason, and be-
cause the Court did not provide the opportunity for full briefing on 
these issues, the decision in Gross fails to account for relevant policy 
considerations. 
 Part II concludes by considering the way forward in the aftermath 
of Gross.21 It appears unlikely that the Court will soon engage in a full 
consideration of the policy concerns that might bear on the desirability 
of burden-shifting for employment discrimination claims. As in 1991, 
the matter is likely to rest with Congress. As of this writing, bills are 
pending in both Houses of Congress that would respond to Gross by 
applying the statutory burden-shifting mechanism to a broad range of 
federal discrimination and retaliation claims.22 Ironically, by signaling 
its dissatisfaction with Price Waterhouse burden-shifting, the Gross Court 
may have spurred a broader adoption of the statutory burden-shifting 
framework. 
I. The Gross Court’s Failure to Carry Its Burden of Proof 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc. provided four related rationales for its decision to reject 
burden-shifting for ADEA discrimination claims.23  First, it reasoned 
that Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting mechanism does not apply to 
ADEA claims—a reasonable view, but one that did not resolve the ap-
plicability of non-statutory burden-shifting under Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.24 Next, it reasoned that the ADEA’s language foreclosed the 
use of burden-shifting.25  Whatever the merits of this argument, the 
Court had reached the opposite view concerning materially similar lan-
guage in Price Waterhouse.26 The Gross Court, recognizing that it was re-
pudiating Price Waterhouse, explained that it was appropriate to do so 
because “it has become evident in the years since that case was decided 
that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For example, in 
cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly difficult to craft an 
instruction to explain its burden-shifting framework.” 27  Finally, the 
                                                                                                                      
20 See infra notes 302–427 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text. 
22 See generally S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009). 
23 See 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348, 2350, 2352 (2009). 
24 Id. at 2348–49. 
25 Id. at 2350. 
26 See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
27 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
284 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:279 
Gross Court suggested—as support for its rejection of Price Waterhouse— 
that the 1991 Act foreclosed the continued application of Price Water-
house to claims under the ADEA.28
 Part I.A. analyzes these rationales and concludes that the linchpin 
of the Gross Court’s analysis was its rejection of Price Waterhouse.29 Absent 
a reason to depart from Price Waterhouse, the decision in Gross would be 
difficult to justify. Yet the only cited rationale for the departure was the 
notion that burden-shifting causes undue confusion.30 Part I.B. consid-
ers three possible arguments concerning confusion.31 It concludes that 
the claim stated in Gross—that burden-shifting instructions are too dif-
ficult to craft—is unsupported.32 Two other types of confusion, how-
ever, deserve more serious consideration. First, there has been very real 
confusion over the applicability of burden-shifting instructions.33  Gross 
puts this type of confusion to rest, but  it was not the only way to do 
so.34 Second, there is the potential for confusion when multiple claims 
go to a jury and different burden structures apply to different claims.35 
Gross, if anything, heightens the risk of that type of confusion. 
A. Gross’s Anatomy 
 To frame the analysis of Gross, it is useful to bear in mind that for 
20 years a number of lower courts had assumed that Price Waterhouse 
burden-shifting was available in ADEA cases.36 The Gross majority stated 
that it refused to “extend” the Price Waterhouse framework to ADEA 
claims—a wording choice that was presumably designed to underscore 
the fact that the Price Waterhouse holding concerned Title VII claims and 
not ADEA claims.37 This is true, but it is also the case that both the Price 
Waterhouse dissent and the Price Waterhouse plurality discussed the new 
framework’s application to ADEA claims (and other claims that would 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. at 2349, 2351 n.5. 
29 See infra notes 36–74 and accompanying text. 
30 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
31 See infra notes 75–301 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 75–301 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 277–301 and accompanying text. 
36 See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (citing Burns v. Gadsden State Cmty. Coll., 908 F.2d 1512, 1517–18 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam) and Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (2d Cir. 
1989)). 
37 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
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be tried to a jury).38 Complaining that the new framework would sow 
perplexity, the Price Waterhouse dissenters predicted that “[c]onfusion in 
the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute 
in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), where courts borrow the Title VII order of 
proof for the conduct of jury trials.”39 The plurality responded that 
“[t]he dissent need not worry that this evidentiary scheme, if used dur-
ing a jury trial, will be so impossibly confused and complex as it imag-
ines. . . . Juries long have decided cases in which defendants raised 
affirmative defenses.”40 Thus, at least seven justices viewed the decision 
as setting a framework for discrimination claims under statutes other 
than Title VII, including claims—such as ADEA claims—that carried 
the right to a jury trial.41
 How, then, did the Gross Court reach the opposite conclusion? 
1. The Inapplicability of Statutory Burden-Shifting 
 The Supreme Court’s holding in Gross that §§ 2000e-2(m) and 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) are inapplicable to ADEA cases was not inevitable, 
but it was unsurprising. By its terms, § 2000e-2(m) applies only to cases 
in which it is claimed “that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor” for an employment practice—a list that does 
not mention age discrimination.42 Section 2000e-5 is similarly inappli-
cable to ADEA actions.43
 There is some evidence that during the drafting of the proposals 
that led to the enactment of the 1991 Act, some participants did con-
sider whether the new statutory approach to mixed-motive claims 
should apply to ADEA claims.44 For instance, Reginald Govan recounts 
his experiences “as a House Democratic staff member in the legislative 
process that culminated in the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J.,  dissenting); id. at 247 n.12 (plural-
ity opinion). 
39 Id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion). 
41 See id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 247 n.12 (plurality opinion). 
42 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
43 See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (addressing “claim[s] in which an individual proves a vio-
lation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title”). 
44 See Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict 
Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 35 
(1993). 
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1991.”45 Govan recalls the work of a group that set out to draft pro-
posed legislation responding to Price Waterhouse and other cases: 
Given the long history of reliance on Title VII precedent to 
interpret the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA), the drafting group discussed whether to 
make proposed amendments to Title VII applicable to the 
ADEA, and whether the failure to do so would leave courts 
free to apply Wards Cove, Price Waterhouse, and Lorrance to age 
discrimination claims.46
Govan’s account leaves unclear the upshot of the discussion.47
  Some insight might be provided by a House Report on one of the 
versions the House considered in the negotiations leading to the en-
actment of the 1991 Act.48 That report—in a section labeled “RELA-
TIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS MODELED AFTER TITLE VII” —states 
as follows: 
A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act . . . are modeled after, and 
have been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII. 
The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after 
Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent 
with Title VII as amended by this Act.49
 This House Report, however, concerned a prior version of the bill; 
some changes were made to the mixed-motives provision before its en-
actment as §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).50 In the end, this dis-
cussion in the House Report seems outweighed by the fact that 
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) do not treat ADEA claims. Ac-
cordingly, even prior to Gross, commentators had concluded that the 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. at 2 n.**. 
46 Id. at 35 (footnote omitted). 
47 The passage quoted in the text is a full paragraph. The next paragraph commences: 
“Other proposals were not so easily dismissed.” Id. This transition leaves ambiguous just 
what was “dismissed.” 
48 Cf. H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694. 
49 Id. at 4 (footnote and citation omitted). 
50 See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1093, 1168–69 
(1993); John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy 
Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 Geo. L.J. 2009, 2048 (1995). 
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statutory burden shift did not apply to ADEA claims.51 And even the 
dissenters in Gross agreed that the statutory burden shift does not gov-
ern such claims.52
2. The ADEA’s Text 
 The Gross majority next focused on the ADEA’s text, which prohib-
its employers from taking various actions “because of” an employee’s 
age.53 The Gross Court’s textual argument depends on two steps. First, 
the Court determined that the statutory language directs the applica-
tion of a “but for” causation standard.54 Second, the Court held that 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting is incompatible with such a standard.55 
As the Price Waterhouse opinions illustrate, neither of these two conclu-
sions is inevitable, and it is only when the two conclusions are com-
bined that they foreclose the sort of burden-shifting undertaken in Price 
Waterhouse.56
 The Price Waterhouse Court confronted materially similar language: 
a Title VII provision prohibiting employers from taking various actions 
“because of” various employee attributes (including sex).57 Justice Bren-
                                                                                                                      
51 See, e.g., Eglit, supra note 50, at 1106 (“[I]t seems analytically appropriate to con-
clude—even if one sympathetic to plaintiffs’ concerns would question from a policy per-
spective the validity of all or parts of the analyses put forth in Lorance, Price Waterhouse, and 
Wards Cove—that those decisions have not been divested of their heavy analogical weight 
for ADEA courts, given Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA to reject or curtail these 
rulings.”). 
52 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended 
only Title VII and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court reasonably 
declines to apply the amended provisions to the ADEA.”). 
53 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) provides, inter alia, that “[i]t shall be unlawful for an em-
ployer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual’s age . . . .” 29 U.S.C.A § 623(a) (West 
2008 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). 
54 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (“To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the 
plain language of the ADEA . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of 
the employer’s adverse decision.”). 
55 See id. at 2351 (“It follows . . . that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains the bur-
den of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse 
action.”). 
56 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in Price Waterhouse, “the plurality’s theory of 
Title VII causation is ultimately consistent with a but-for standard . . . .” 490 U.S. at 283 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
57 Then, as now, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 provided in part that “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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nan, writing for the plurality, probably would have agreed with the sec-
ond of the Gross Court’s propositions, but he rejected the first: The plu-
rality concluded that the statutory language did not denote but-for cau-
sation.58 The plurality presumably reasoned that if but-for causation was 
required, then—as Price Waterhouse contended59—a burden-shifting 
framework would be inappropriate. By contrast, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in the judgment in Price Waterhouse foreshadowed the first 
of the Gross Court’s propositions while rejecting the second.60 Justice 
O’Connor argued that even though “because of” denotes “but for” cau-
sation,61 that conclusion need not foreclose burden-shifting: “The ques-
tion for decision in this case is what allocation of the burden of persua-
sion on the issue of causation best conforms with the intent of Congress 
and the purposes behind Title VII.”62 Justice White eschewed both these 
“semantic discussions” and relied simply on a precedent from the § 1983 
context, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle.63
 Although no five justices in Price Waterhouse agreed on a particular 
textual analysis, the fact remains that six justices held in that case that 
the “because of” language in Title VII permitted burden-shifting. It 
would be difficult to justify reaching a different conclusion concerning 
the same language in the ADEA without rejecting Price Waterhouse. 
3. Rejecting Price Waterhouse 
 As noted above, the Gross majority rested its rejection of the Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting framework partly on the assertion that the 
framework is confusing for juries: 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240 (plurality opinion) (“We take these words to 
mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words 
‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ as does Price Waterhouse, is to 
misunderstand them.”); see also id. at 241 (“When . . . an employer considers both gender 
and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex 
and the other, legitimate considerations—even if we may say later, in the context of litiga-
tion, that the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into ac-
count.”). 
59 See Brief for the Petitioner at *18, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167), 1988 
WL 1025858. 
60 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261–79 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
61 See id. at 262–63 (“I disagree with the plurality’s dictum that the words ‘because of’ 
do not mean ‘but-for’ causation; manifestly they do.”). 
62 Id. at 263. 
63 Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). For a discussion of Mt. Healthy, 
see infra notes 310–342 and accompanying text. 
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Whatever the deficiencies of Price Waterhouse in retrospect, it 
has become evident in the years since that case was decided 
that its burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. For ex-
ample, in cases tried to a jury, courts have found it particularly 
difficult to craft an instruction to explain its burden-shifting 
framework . . . . Thus, even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally 
sound, the problems associated with its application have 
eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its framework 
to ADEA claims.64
In Part I.B., I conclude that this claim of jury confusion is unsup-
ported.65 To the extent that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting gives rise to 
confusion, I argue that the confusion arises from two other problems 
not specifically identified by the Gross Court, and I suggest that the 
Gross Court did not adopt the best strategy for ameliorating the confu-
sion. For the moment, however, it suffices to note that this is the ful-
crum of the Court’s opinion: To justify its textual analysis of the ADEA, 
the Court was obliged to explain why Price Waterhouse’s holding con-
cerning the same language in Title VII was inapplicable; and to explain 
its repudiation of Price Waterhouse, the Court relied centrally on the no-
tion that burden-shifting causes undue confusion.66
4. The 1991 Act’s Effect on Burden-Shifting for ADEA Claims 
 The Court did adduce one further basis for rejecting Price Water-
house: in a footnote, the Court suggested that the 1991 Act itself fore-
closes the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting under the 
ADEA.67 As noted above, the conclusion that the 1991 Act’s burden-
shifting scheme does not cover ADEA claims is neither surprising nor 
particularly controversial.68 But the Gross majority went further, arguing 
that Congress’s choice to provide for statutory burden-shifting in the 
Title VII context without doing the same for ADEA claims forecloses 
the continued application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA 
claims.69 This step in the Court’s argument is unpersuasive.70
                                                                                                                      
64 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
65 See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text. 
66 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
67 See id. at 2351 n.5. 
68 See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text. 
69 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5. 
70 For a thoughtful critique of this aspect of the Gross Court’s reasoning, see Katz, supra 
note 16, at 871–72. 
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 The Gross majority reasoned as follows: Congress amended both 
Title VII and the ADEA in the 1991 Act, but chose not to add to the 
ADEA any provisions similar to §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).71 
The Court asserted that “[w]hen Congress amends one statutory provi-
sion but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”72 In 
this instance, the Gross majority implied, Congress’s inaction indicated 
an intent to displace the use of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting in the 
ADEA context: 
Congress not only explicitly added “motivating factor” liability 
to Title VII . . . but it also partially abrogated Price Water-
house’s holding by eliminating an employer’s complete af-
firmative defense to “motivating factor” claims, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). If such “motivating factor” claims were 
already part of Title VII, the addition of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
alone would have been sufficient. Congress’ careful tailoring 
of the “motivating factor” claim in Title VII, as well as the ab-
sence of a provision parallel to § 2000e-2(m) in the ADEA, 
confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting framework into the ADEA.73
 Contrary to the Gross Court’s assertion, under Price Waterhouse mo-
tivating factor claims were already part of Title VII. The problem that 
Congress evidently sought to remedy was that the Price Waterhouse same-
decision defense gave the employer a complete defense to liability, not 
just to damages. The 1991 Act changed that framework, for the pur-
poses of Title VII claims, to one in which the employer’s same-decision 
defense merely limits certain types of remedies. To effectuate that pur-
pose, it arguably would not have sufficed (pace the Gross majority) 
merely to add § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)’s limits on remedies, because under 
Price Waterhouse if the defendant proved the same-decision defense one 
never arrived at the remedy stage. 
 Moreover, the Gross Court’s apparent assertion that the 1991 Act 
forecloses the applicability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA 
claims would seem to fly in the face of Congress’s overall intent in en-
acting the legislation. For one thing, as the Gross dissenters observed, 
“Congress emphasized in passing the 1991 Act that the motivating-
factor test was consistent with its original intent in enacting Title VII.”74 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Gross 129 S. Ct. at 2351 n.5. 
72 Id. at 2349. 
73 Id. at 2351 n.5. 
74 Id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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For another, to the extent that Congress addressed the Price Waterhouse 
issue at all, it was to alter its framework—for the purpose of Title VII 
claims—in a way that was believed to make claims easier to prove. Such 
an intent would seem inconsistent with an intent to make ADEA claims 
harder to prove by removing the availability of Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting. 
 In sum, this Part has identified four arguments at work in Gross. 
The argument discussed in Part I.A.1 is reasonable but inapposite. The 
argument discussed in Part I.A.4 is implausible. The argument discussed 
in Part I.A.2 depends for its persuasiveness on the decision to repudiate 
Price Waterhouse. And, as noted in Part I.A.3, the repudiation of Price 
Waterhouse rests centrally upon the contention that burden-shifting is 
unduly confusing. It is to that contention that I return in Part I.B. 
B. Three Types of Confusion 
 When assessing the contention that Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting should be rejected because it causes undue confusion, it makes 
sense to begin with the type of confusion alluded to in Gross. Accord-
ingly, Part I.B.1 examines the evidence for the Gross Court’s assertion 
that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instructions are inherently confus-
ing.75 Although this evidence is at best inconclusive, there are two other 
types of confusion that could ground a more persuasive critique of Price 
Waterhouse. Part I.B.2 examines one potent source of confusion—the 
difficulties of delineating when to give a burden-shifting instruction 
and when to give a burden-retaining instruction with respect to a type 
of claim concerning which burden-shifting is potentially applicable.76 
That sort of confusion is likely to afflict the judges charged with formu-
lating (or reviewing) jury instructions. Part I.B.3 notes that Gross’s ap-
plication may extend beyond ADEA discrimination claims and briefly 
surveys the case’s possible impact on other types of employment 
claims.77 This analysis lays the groundwork for my examination, in Part 
I.B.4, of a different type of confusion—namely, that which arises when 
juries hear multiple claims that are subject to differing burden frame-
works.78
                                                                                                                      
75 See infra notes 79–107 and accompanying text. 
76 See infra notes 108–208 and accompanying text. 
77 See infra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 277–295 and accompanying text. 
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1. Are Burden-Shifting Instructions Inherently Confusing? 
 To inform our analysis of the Gross Court’s jury-confusion ration-
ale, it may be helpful to consider the sort of instruction that a court 
might have given in an ADEA mixed-motive case prior to Gross:79
 In this case Mr. Jones is alleging that that Acme Corp. vio-
lated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it fired 
him. To win on this claim, Mr. Jones must prove both of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 First: Acme fired Mr. Jones; and 
 Second: Mr. Jones’ age was a motivating factor in Acme’s 
decision. 
 In showing that his age was a motivating factor for Acme’s 
action, Mr. Jones is not required to prove that his age was the 
sole motivation or even the primary motivation for Acme’s 
decision. Mr. Jones need only prove that his age played a mo-
tivating part in Acme’s decision even though other factors 
may also have motivated Acme. 
 If you find in Mr. Jones’ favor with respect to each of the 
facts that he must prove, you must then decide whether Acme 
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have fired Mr. Jones regardless of his age. Your verdict must 
be for Acme if it proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have fired Mr. Jones even if his age had played 
no role in the decision. 
Is this sort of instruction too confusing for juries? For comparison pur-
poses, here is a “determinative factor” instruction (given in cases where 
burden-shifting does not apply):80
                                                                                                                      
 
79 For the instructions actually given in Gross, see Joint Appendix at *9–10, Gross, 129 S. 
Ct. 2343 (No. 080-441), 2009 WL 192466. 
80 The examples given in the text are deliberately simplified. For example, it is stan-
dard in a determinative-factor instruction to include a discussion of pretext. The instruc-
tion might state, for example: “Acme has stated that it fired Mr. Jones because he was care-
less in his work habits. If you disbelieve Acme’s explanation for firing Mr. Jones, then you 
may, but need not, find that Mr. Jones has proved intentional discrimination.” 
Although it is common to distinguish between the burden-retaining and burden-
shifting frameworks by referring to the “McDonnell Douglas framework” and the “Price Wa-
terhouse framework,” this shorthand should not be taken to suggest that burden-retaining 
instructions should include a discussion of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine structure, under 
which the plaintiff sets out a prima facie case, the defendant articulates a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action, and the plaintiff rebuts the defendant’s 
stated reason. That structure drops out of the picture at trial and there is no reason to 
discuss it in the jury instructions. See Gerrilyn G. Brill, Instructing the Jury in an Employment 
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 In this case Mr. Jones is alleging that that Acme Corp. vio-
lated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it fired 
him. To win on this claim, Mr. Jones must prove both of the 
following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 First: Acme fired Mr. Jones; and 
 Second: Mr. Jones’ age was a determinative factor in Acme’s 
decision. 
 “Determinative factor” means that if not for Mr. Jones’ age, 
Acme would not have fired him. 
Comparing the two instructions, one can see that they both present the 
question of but-for causation. The burden-shifting instruction, however, 
breaks the causation question down into two steps and shifts the bur-
den to the defendant at the second step. It is not clear why this would 
be unduly confusing for juries. Juries in employment discrimination 
cases, like juries in other cases, may deal with a number of affirmative 
defenses on which the defendant has the burden of proof.81 Moreover, 
if additional clarity is desired, the court can ask the jury to answer both 
of the two questions—motivating-factor and same-decision—on a spe-
cial verdict form.82
 In any event, the authorities the Gross Court cited in support of 
that assertion provide no evidence on the question.83 Moreover, other 
available data do not permit us to measure in any systematic way 
whether a burden-shifting instruction confuses jurors. 
 As evidence that “courts have found it particularly difficult to craft 
an instruction to explain [Price Waterhouse’s] burden-shifting frame-
work,” the Gross Court cited two sources: the Second Circuit’s 1992 
                                                                                                                      
Discrimination Case, 1998 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 2, 9; Susan K. Grebeldinger, Instructing the Jury 
in a Case of Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment: Thoroughness or Simplicity?, 12 Lab. 
Law. 399, 419 (1997); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After 
Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2323 (1995). 
81 A notable example is the employer’s defense to liability in a hostile-environment 
case in which no tangible employment action was taken: 
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary ele-
ments: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and cor-
rect promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
82 See Brill, supra note 80, at 4. 
83 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
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opinion in Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. and a 1991 dissent by Judge 
Flaum in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.84 Both sources had 
been similarly cited by the respondent in Gross for the proposition that 
“courts have found Price Waterhouse hard to implement in the jury trial 
context.”85 Neither source supports the Court’s assertion. 
 The Tyler court did indeed refer to “the murky water of shifting 
burdens in discrimination cases.”86 But this remark in Tyler—a case ad-
dressing a claim under New York’s Human Rights Law—likely referred 
to other doctrinal complexities. The court may, for example, have been 
alluding to the direct/circumstantial evidence dichotomy that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would later address in Desert Palace v. Costa,87 or per-
haps to the question of whether the 1991 Act’s statutory burden-
shifting scheme should affect the interpretation of New York’s Human 
Rights Law.88 In any event, it does not appear that the Tyler court was 
addressing the inherent difficulty of crafting a burden-shifting instruc-
tion. In fact, the Tyler court specifically approved a Price Waterhouse bur-
den-shifting instruction: 
[A]n instruction which allows the jury to determine (1) 
whether an illegitimate criterion was a substantial or motivat-
ing factor in an adverse employment decision, and (2) if so, 
whether the employer has met its burden of proving that the 
employment decision would have happened anyway, properly 
captures the import of the Human Rights Law (or ADEA, or 
title VII).89
 In Visser, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting framework applied to ADEA cases, but it af-
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. at 2352 (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1179 (2d Cir. 
1992); Visser, 924 F.2d at 661 (Flaum, J., dissenting)). 
85 Brief for Respondent at *33, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 507026; 
accord id. at *33–34, *33 n.25. 
86 Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1179. 
87 See id. at 1180 (noting that the defendant “claims that . . . Price Waterhouse requires 
the plaintiff to produce ‘direct evidence’ of discrimination before the defendant can be 
saddled with the burden of proving that the same action would have been taken even in 
the absence of impermissible factors . . .”); id. at 1183 (stating that the court’s “biggest 
problem” is “whether Price Waterhouse requires the plaintiff to show ‘direct evidence’ of 
discrimination as a precondition to shifting into mixed-motives analysis”). 
88 See id. at 1182 (“Because New York courts have in the past turned to federal law for 
guidance in administering the Human Rights Law, this amendment may have potential 
importance for future cases under the New York law. However, since New York courts have 
not yet spoken on the subject, we will not attempt to apply the new federal statute in this 
case.”). 
89 Id. at 1187. 
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firmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant because it 
held that the plaintiff had failed to show that age was a “substantial fac-
tor” in his firing. 90  Judge Flaum dissented, arguing that summary 
judgment was inappropriate. 91  In the course of the dissent, Judge 
Flaum observed: “The difficulty judges have in formulating [burden-
shifting] instructions and jurors have in applying them can be seen in 
the fact that jury verdicts in ADEA cases are supplanted by judgments 
notwithstanding the verdict or reversed on appeal more frequently 
than jury verdicts generally.”92 Judge Flaum’s sole support for this con-
tention was a 1987 note by a student, Kimberlye K. Fayssoux.93 Interest-
ingly, Justice Kennedy had cited the same student note in his Price 
Waterhouse dissent for the proposition that there was a “high reversal 
rate caused by [the] use of Title VII burden shifting in a jury setting.”94
 There are two problems with the citation of Fayssoux’s note for the 
proposition that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting confuses juries. First, 
Fayssoux focused her analysis not on the mixed-motive/same-decision 
framework that would later be approved in Price Waterhouse, but rather 
on “the difficulties encountered in applying the McDonnell Douglas 
standard to age discrimination cases tried by jury.”95 Second, although 
it is true that Fayssoux asserted that “a review of ADEA cases illustrates 
that the courts are overturning jury verdicts at an alarming rate[,]” 
Fayssoux cited no evidence that would permit a conclusion concerning 
the rate at which jury verdicts are overturned in ADEA cases.96 Her 
body of evidence on the subject appears in two footnotes, which cite 
four cases in which a district court granted defendants’ J.N.O.V. mo-
tions;97 eight cases in which lower-court denials of J.N.O.V. were re-
versed on appeal;98 and five cases in which an appellate court affirmed 
the grant of J.N.O.V.99 Leaving aside the fact that all these cases dated 
from the 1980s, the basic problem is that citing seventeen cases in 
which J.N.O.V. was granted tells us nothing about the rate at which jury 
                                                                                                                      
90 Visser, 924 F.2d at 658, 660, abrogated by Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
91 Id. at 662 (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 661. 
93 See id. (citing Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 Va. L. Rev. 601, 601 & nn.14–15, 606 (1987)). 
94 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Fayssoux, supra 
note 93). 
95 Fayssoux, supra note 93, at 604. 
96 Id. at 615 n.90. 
97 See id. at 603 n.14. 
98 See id. at 603 n.15. 
99 See id. 
296 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:279 
verdicts are overturned in ADEA cases and, therefore, provides no basis 
for comparing that rate to the rate at which jury verdicts are over-
turned in other types of cases. 
 If the Gross Court had wished to examine data on reversals of jury 
verdicts in employment discrimination cases, there exist better data on 
that question—but it would be difficult to derive from those data any 
inferences concerning the functioning of Price Waterhouse burden shift-
ing. For example, evidence is available concerning the rate of appellate 
reversals in employment discrimination cases that progressed all the 
way through trial.100 Kevin Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg, and Stewart 
Schwab used a data set containing information on federal court em-
ployment discrimination cases to study dispositions on appeal during 
the period from 1987 to 2000.101 They found that, for cases decided 
after trial, appeals were taken in 16.55% of the cases.102 In those cases, 
the reversal rate varied dramatically depending on which side took the 
appeal: defendants obtained reversals in over 42% of their appeals, 
while plaintiffs obtained reversals in less than 7% of their appeals.103 
The authors point out that the defendants’ reversal rate is unusually 
high (relative to almost all other types of cases), and that the plaintiffs’ 
reversal rate is unusually low by the same measure.104
 Do these figures reveal anything about Price Waterhouse instruc-
tions? The types of cases that the study included could have featured a 
Price Waterhouse-style burden-shifting instruction because they involved 
types of claims for which such a burden-shifting instruction is (or has 
been) sometimes used.105 But not all cases go to the jury on a burden-
shifting motivating-factor instruction; some (probably most) instead go 
the jury on a burden-retaining “determinative factor” instruction.106  
                                                                                                                      
100 See Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals, 7 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 547, 554 display 3 (2003). 
101 See id. at 548–50. 
102 Id. at 551 display 1. In cases where the plaintiff won at trial, appeals were taken al-
most thirteen percent of the time, while in cases where the defendant won at trial, appeals 
were taken slightly over eighteen percent of the time. See id. Defendant wins at trial were 
considerably more frequent than plaintiff wins at trial. See id. 
103 See id. at 554 display 3. 
104 See id. at 556 display 4, 557–58 display 5. 
105 The “Jobs 442” case category that defined the data set included claims under Title 
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the ADEA, the Family Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”), § 1981, and § 1983. Id. at 549. 
106 See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whith-
er McDonnell Douglas?, 53 Emory L.J. 1887, 1942 (2004) (asserting that “the vast majority 
of individual discrimination cases have been treated as McDonnell Douglas cases” rather 
than as Price Waterhouse cases). 
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Without knowing which type of instruction was employed in each case 
and without knowing whether a problem with the instruction was the 
cause for reversal on appeal, it is impossible to know whether the rever-
sal rate reveals anything about problems with burden-shifting jury in-
structions. It is, however, possible to make an educated guess. In other 
work, Clermont and Schwab have found that employment discrimina-
tion plaintiffs do worse than other types of plaintiffs at each stage of 
federal litigation (not merely on appeal): 
They manage many fewer happy resolutions early in litigation, 
and so they have to proceed toward trial more often. They win 
a lower proportion of cases during pretrial and at trial. Then, 
more of their successful cases are appealed. On appeal, they 
have a harder time upholding their successes and reversing 
adverse outcomes.107
In the light of these data, it would hardly be surprising to find that jury 
verdicts in ADEA cases are overturned more often than jury verdicts in 
general—and such a finding would not provide particular support for 
the view that confusion concerning a burden-shifting instruction was 
the explanation for decisions to overturn jury verdicts in ADEA cases. 
 In sum, even if the Gross Court had looked for better evidence con-
cerning the effect of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instructions, it 
seems doubtful that any such evidence would have come to light. 
2. Confusion over Applicability of Burden-Shifting Instructions 
 Perhaps—although the Gross opinion did not mention it—the con-
cern over administrability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting stemmed 
instead from the difficulties courts have experienced in discerning when 
a case merits a burden-shifting instruction as opposed to a burden-
retaining instruction. Judging from the oral argument in Gross, concern 
over this type of confusion did trouble some justices, which is unsurpris-
ing, given that the petition in Gross sought guidance on precisely this 
question.108 In fact, the boundaries of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting 
                                                                                                                      
 
107 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 429, 429 (2004). 
108 See Transcript of Oral Argument at *7, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 
832958 ( Justice Alito: “[I]f there is a direct evidence requirement, it may arguably cause a 
great deal of problem [sic] when the trial judge has to give an instruction to the jury, be-
cause then the—the jury will first have to decide whether a particular type of evidence is 
present in the case before it can tell what—who has the burden of proof and what the 
standard is . . . .”); id. at *16 ( Justice Kennedy: “[A]re there any tactical difficulties or 
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have always been contested. It was clear from the start that difficult 
questions would arise concerning the applicability of the Price Waterhouse 
burden-shifting scheme. During the drafting of the Price Waterhouse opin-
ions, the reach of the burden-shifting mechanism was a central focus of 
negotiations among the justices.109 After the release of those opinions, 
the controversy continued, with courts developing divergent views con-
cerning the range of cases to which the burden-shifting scheme could 
apply.110 Neither the 1991 Act nor the Court’s 2003 decision in Desert 
Palace has settled the question. 
 The Court’s 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy anchored much of the 
Court’s later discussion of burden-shifting in Price Waterhouse.111 In Mt. 
Healthy, which involved a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court 
held that if the plaintiff proved that the impermissible motive was “a 
‘substantial factor’ —or, to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivat-
ing factor’” in the challenged decision, the burden shifted to the de-
fendant to prove that it would have made the same decision anyway.112 
As noted below, it appears that the second of these two alternatives— 
motivating factor—was added after Justice Marshall expressed concern 
about a prior draft’s use of the terms “substantial factor” and “signifi-
cant role.”113 Less than six years later, in NLRB v. Transportation Man-
agement Corp., a unanimous Court approved a test employed by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) for adjudicating claims that a 
worker was discharged based on mixed motives, one of which was the 
worker’s union activity.114 The Court used a number of different formu-
lations when describing the NLRB’s test: “contributed to,” “in any way 
motivated by,” “based in whole or in part on,” and (twice) “a substantial 
or motivating factor.”115 And the Court characterized the Mt. Healthy 
standard as directing a court to ask whether “protected expression 
played a role in the employer’s decision.”116
                                                                                                                      
strategic difficulties that counsel face if they don’t quite know which way the burden is 
going to shift before trial . . . .”). 
109 See infra notes 121–140. 
110 See infra notes 155–164 and accompanying text. 
111 See generally Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274. 
112 Id. at 287 (citation omitted). 
113 See infra notes 323–330 and accompanying text. 
114 462 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1983). For an account by “one of the NLRB attorneys who 
developed the agency’s strategy in the Wright Line/Transportation Management litigation[,]” 
see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 Berke-
ley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163, 190 (2007) (describing “the active role that lawyers played in 
arguing across . . . doctrinal borders”). 
115 Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 395, 399, 400–01. 
116 Id. at 403. 
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 During oral argument in Price Waterhouse, both the advocates and 
some of the justices discussed the applicability of Mt. Healthy.117 Press-
ing Price Waterhouse’s lawyer, for instance, Justice O’Connor asked, 
“you argue for some ‘but for’ standard of causation? Or are you willing 
to settle for a substantial factor?”118  The lawyer responded that she 
would choose the “but for” standard; but a few minutes later, Justice 
O’Connor once again alluded to the Mt. Healthy test.119 In turn, Hop-
kins’s lawyer relied on the Mt. Healthy test, but (with a nod to Transpor-
tation Management) added the alternative formulation “played a role.”120
 In early December 1988 Justice Brennan circulated the first draft 
of an opinion in Price Waterhouse. 121  Justices Marshall and Stevens 
promptly agreed to join the opinion, while Justice Kennedy accepted 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s invitation to write a dissent. 122  Justice 
O’Connor, however, wrote to express three concerns with the draft 
opinion.123  Among other things, Justice O’Connor worried that the 
draft’s use of the phrase “played a part” would give plaintiffs recourse 
to the burden-shifting framework too often.124 Noting that Mt. Healthy 
used the terms “‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’” and that this lan-
guage was repeated in Transportation Management, Justice O’Connor 
argued that the draft opinion should always use these formulations 
rather than what she viewed as the looser term “played a part”: 
I much prefer to retain the “substantial or motivating” factor 
language . . . as I think it more clearly suggests that stray re-
                                                                                                                      
117 Audio Tape: The Oyez Project, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins—Oral Argument (Oct. 31, 
1988), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980–1989/1988/1988_87_1167/argument. 
118 Id. at 4:20. 
119 See id. at 9:32 (“Well, there’s language in a number of cases out there that it’s 
enough to show that the discriminatory reason was a substantial factor.”). 
120 See id. at 32:17 ( James H. Heller argued for the respondent: “What we believe the 
Plaintiff must show is clearly marked by this Court’s decisions. A motivating factor, a sub-
stantial factor. And Transportation Management, I believe, characterized Mt. Healthy as 
saying, played a role.”). 
121 See First Draft, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr. on Dec. 8, 1988). Citations to internal memoranda and other in-
ternal Court documents concerning Price Waterhouse are to items in Box 519 of the Papers 
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun at the Library of Congress. 
122 See generally Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Brennan (Dec. 9, 1988) 
(on file with author); Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Dec. 9, 
1988) (on file with author); Memorandum from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice Ken-
nedy (Dec. 9, 1988) (on file with author); Memorandum from Justice Kennedy to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 9, 1988) (on file with author). 
123 See generally Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan (Dec. 13, 
1988) (on file with author). 
124 Id. at 1–2. 
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marks at the workplace, even by those responsible for man-
agement decisions, do not in and of themselves require a 
burden shift to the employer. The illegitimate criterion must 
actually have been relied upon by the decisionmaker in the 
case at hand.125
 Justice Brennan responded by thanking Justice O’Connor for her 
“extensive and helpful memo;” he expressed a willingness to make 
changes in response to some of her suggestions, but he took issue with 
others. 126  Focusing on Justice O’Connor’s concern about “stray re-
marks,” Justice Brennan proposed to add language stating as follows: 
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not, in 
and of themselves, indicate that gender played a part in a par-
ticular employment decision. Rather, the plaintiff must show 
that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its 
decision. This is not to say, however, that such remarks cannot 
be evidence that gender played such a part.127
As one can see from the preceding quotation, Justice Brennan was un-
willing to give up reliance on the term “played a part.” As he explained: 
I prefer to allay your concern in this fashion rather than by 
adding the “substantial factor” language throughout the opin-
ion. Such language, I think, deflects attention from the im-
portant question in a case of this kind, which is whether gen-
der was a consideration in an employment decision . . . . 
[T]he language and legislative history of Title VII demon-
strate that gender is irrelevant to such decisions. To add the 
wording that you suggest might be taken to mean that some 
discrimination in employment decisions is acceptable, as long 
as it is not “substantial.”128
                                                                                                                      
125 Id. Justice O’Connor also expressed concern about the draft’s characterization of 
the McDonnell Douglas test and about the draft’s explanation of the nature of the em-
ployer’s burden on the same-decision defense. See id. at 2–5. Justice White followed Justice 
O’Connor’s memorandum with one of his own urging Justice Brennan to “give favorable 
consideration to Sandra’s suggestions, particularly her third one” (i.e., the point concern-
ing the employer’s burden). See Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan 
(Dec. 13, 1988.) 
126 Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 1 (Dec. 14, 1988) (on file 
with author). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. In the margin next to this paragraph, Justice Blackmun wrote “good” and “cor-
rect.” Id. 
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 Justice O’Connor’s response indicates that Justice Brennan had 
narrowed the scope of her concerns, which now focused largely on her 
preference for the term “substantial factor”: 
[M]y main concern remaining is the threshold proof neces-
sary to allow a plaintiff to take advantage of the favorable evi-
dentiary framework of Price Waterhouse . . . . Unless it is made 
clear that this evidentiary framework is not to be invoked 
unless a forbidden criterion was a “substantial factor” in the 
employment decision, I may be forced to limit my concur-
rence to the judgment.129
Although Justice O’Connor cited a number of arguments in favor of 
her preferred language—for example, that the language appeared in 
Mt. Healthy and Transportation Management and in lower court employ-
ment-discrimination case law—her underlying concern appears to have 
been that shifting the burden to the defendant would be “strong medi-
cine” that should be carefully controlled: 
I view the evidentiary rule of Price Waterhouse as a supplement 
to the McDonnell Douglas framework for use in cases, like this 
one, where the employer has created uncertainty as to causa-
tion by knowingly giving substantial weight to an irrelevant 
characteristic. In such a situation, I agree that a strong deter-
rent message is needed. I think the “substantial factor” test 
gives trial judges the discretion to determine when this tool is 
necessary and when it is not.130
 A few days later, Justice Blackmun agreed to join Justice Brennan’s 
opinion.131 Justice Blackmun’s law clerk had expressed the hope that if 
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion, “perhaps Justice White would 
provide the necessary fifth [vote].”132 No such vote was forthcoming, 
however, and there the matter sat until after the New Year. 
 In early January 1989, Justice Brennan wrote to Justice O’Connor 
that he remained “strongly inclined against adding the ‘substantial fac-
                                                                                                                      
129 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 3 (Dec. 16, 1988) (on file 
with author). 
130 Id. at 1, 2. 
131 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan 1 (Dec. 19, 1988) (on file 
with author). 
132 Memorandum from “Eddie” to Justice Blackmun 1 (Dec. 17, 1988) (on file with au-
thor). The law clerk reported that Justice Brennan’s clerk was “fuming” in reaction to Jus-
tice O’Connor’s memo. Id. 
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tor’ language to this opinion.”133 Justice Brennan argued that the term 
“substantial factor” was used in Mt. Healthy and Transportation Manage-
ment “not in order to suggest that the discrimination must be of a cer-
tain magnitude before the burden must shift, but in order to drive 
home the point that an impermissible motive must actually play a part 
in an employment decision in order to justify such a shift.”134 He ac-
knowledged, however, that this was not the only possible reading of the 
term, and he asserted that he wished to avoid the ambiguity that would 
result from perpetuating the “substantial factor” language as the test in 
Price Waterhouse.135 These arguments failed to sway Justice O’Connor; 
she promptly responded that she planned to write separately.136 This 
response elicited a concession from Justice Brennan, who stated that in 
order to win Justice O’Connor’s support for the draft he would agree to 
insert “motivating” before “part” in various places where the draft cur-
rently used the term “play a part.”137
 Perhaps such a concession, if it had come earlier, would have per-
suaded Justice O’Connor to join Justice Brennan’s opinion. But her 
response to Justice Brennan indicates that before she received his offer, 
she “had concluded that our differences in this case went beyond mere 
linguistics, and had begun work on a concurring opinion.” 138  She 
agreed that the changes Justice Brennan proposed “would be helpful” 
and “certainly could change the bottom line” on any opinion she 
wrote, but she stated that she would need to write her thoughts down in 
order to assess the question.139
 It was still unclear at this point whether Justice Brennan would 
gain a fifth vote in support of his opinion; Justice White had indicated 
that he would wait to see Justice O’Connor’s draft. 140  Accordingly, 
when Justice Kennedy circulated the first draft of his dissent, he warned 
that Justice Brennan’s approach “will mean that almost every Title VII 
                                                                                                                      
133 Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 3 ( Jan. 5, 1989) (on file 
with author). 
134 Id. at 1. 
135 See id. 
136 See Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 1 ( Jan. 5, 1989) (on 
file with author). 
137 See Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice O’Connor 1 ( Jan. 6, 1989) (on 
file with author). 
138 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan 1 ( Jan. 10, 1989) (on file 
with author). 
139 Id. 
140 See Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Brennan 1 (Feb. 13, 1989) (on file 
with author). 
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plaintiff will be able to claim that her case is one of ‘mixed motives.’”141 
He reasoned that plaintiffs ordinarily do not sue unless they have more 
than a mere prima facie case: “Almost all plaintiffs will bring at least 
some additional evidence suggesting discrimination. When they do, the 
‘motivating factor’ standard will be met, and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion shifted to the defendant.”142
 Ultimately, Justice O’Connor and Justice White each wrote sepa-
rately, with the well-known result that Justice Brennan wrote only for a 
plurality.143 The plurality opinion used the “played a motivating part” 
standard at key points (such as when the plurality summed up its hold-
ing), but retained the “played a part” language in other places.144 Jus-
tice White relied on Mt. Healthy and concluded that “as Justice 
O’Connor states, [plaintiff’s] burden was to show that the unlawful mo-
tive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action.”145 Jus-
tice O’Connor, for her part, indicated that she would require the plain-
tiff to produce “direct” evidence that the invidious motive was a “sub-
stantial factor” in the decision in order to qualify for Price Waterhouse 
burden-shifting. 146  She reasoned that such burden-shifting diverged 
from the Court’s existing McDonnell Douglas proof structure and that, as 
such, the burden-shifting mechanism “requires justification, and its out-
lines should be carefully drawn.”147 She enumerated types of evidence 
that would not suffice: 
[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of 
sexual harassment . . . cannot justify requiring the employer 
to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, 
or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process itself . . . .148
In Justice O’Connor’s view, to qualify for burden-shifting the plaintiff 
must present “direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial 
                                                                                                                      
141 First draft at 13, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by Justice 
Kennedy, dissenting, on Feb. 14, 1989). 
142 Id. at 14. 
143 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231 (plurality opinion); id. at 258 (White, concur-
ring in the judgment); id at 261 (O’Connor, concurring in the judgment). 
144 See, e.g., id. at 244–45, 246, 247 n.12, 258 (plurality opinion). 
145 Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
146 Id. at 271, 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
147 Id. at 270. 
148 Id. at 277. 
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negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their deci-
sion.”149
 Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, had revised his dissent to reflect the 
narrowness of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in the judgment.150 Cit-
ing her opinion and Justice White’s opinion, the dissenters argued that 
the result—under the Price Waterhouse opinions—would be that “[t]he 
shift in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by 
direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor actually 
relied upon in making the decision.” 151  Rather than decrying the 
breadth of the burden-shifting mechanism (as the first draft did), the 
published dissent stressed the “limited” and “closely defined” scope of 
the mechanism.152 But the dissenters also pointed out that these limita-
tions would cause their own problems by requiring the lower courts to 
parse the meaning of “substantial” and to apply “the often subtle and 
difficult distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ or ‘circumstantial’ 
evidence.”153 The dissenters further asserted that “[c]onfusion in the 
application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in 
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), where courts borrow the Title VII order of 
proof for the conduct of jury trials.”154
 In the years following Price Waterhouse, a number of courts con-
cluded that the direct/circumstantial distinction provided the dividing 
line between cases that warranted burden-shifting and those that did 
not. To justify Price Waterhouse burden-shifting, those courts required 
“direct evidence” that an invidious motive as well as a legitimate motive 
drove the relevant decision.155 As the Gross dissenters would later point 
                                                                                                                      
 
149 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S at 277. 
150 See id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. 
152 See id.; First draft at 13, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167) (circulated by 
Justice Kennedy, dissenting, on Feb. 14, 1989). 
153 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 292. 
155 Relevant cases include those applying the non-statutory (Price Waterhouse) burden-
shifting mechanism to types of claims that they did not regard as encompassed within the 
statutory burden-shifting scheme. See, e.g., Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 
409, 414–15 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation may establish her 
case for causation in one of two ways: she may either present direct evidence of retaliation, 
which is also known as the ‘mixed-motive’ method of proving retaliatory motivation; or she 
may provide circumstantial evidence creating a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.”); 
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (ADEA 
claim); Vesprini v. Shaw Contract Flooring Servs., Inc., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2002) (ob-
serving that the “contours” of the direct-evidence requirement were “murky” but nonethe-
less applying it in an ADEA case); E.E.O.C. v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 922 (8th 
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out, this conclusion was dubious given that neither the Price Waterhouse 
plurality nor Justice White mentioned any requirement of “direct evi-
dence.”156 But Justice O’Connor’s approach nonetheless gained cur-
rency. The analysis was further complicated by the fact that the 1991 
Act replaced Price Waterhouse for Title VII discrimination claims with the 
statutory burden-shifting mechanism found in §§ 2000e-2(m) and 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B).157 A number of courts applied the direct-evidence 
requirement when administering the statutory mechanism as well.158
 As Justice Kennedy predicted, the line between direct and circum-
stantial evidence proved difficult to draw, and courts took varying posi-
tions.159 The First Circuit’s widely-cited decision in Fernandes v. Costa 
Bros. Masonry classified the circuits’ approaches into “three schools of 
thought.”160 First, it noted the “Classic” position, under which courts 
hold “that the term [direct evidence] signifies evidence which, if be-
lieved, suffices to prove the fact of discriminatory animus without in-
ference, presumption, or resort to other evidence.”161  A second ap-
proach is the “Animus Plus” position, which defines direct evidence “as 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of conduct or statements that 
(1) reflect directly the alleged discriminatory animus and (2) bear 
squarely on the contested employment decision.” 162  The Fernandes 
court noted that “[c]ourts endorsing the animus plus position do not 
distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence in the classic 
sense but, rather, emphasize that the mixed-motive trigger depends on 
                                                                                                                      
Cir. 2002) (ADEA claim); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 2002) (ADEA 
claim). 
156 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because Justice White pro-
vided a fifth vote for the rationale explaining the result of the Price Waterhouse decision, his 
concurrence is properly understood as controlling, and he, like the plurality, did not re-
quire the introduction of direct evidence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted). 
157 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
158 See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Desert 
Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
159 See, e.g., Fakete, 308 F.3d at 338 n.2 (“[W]hile courts agree on what is not direct evi-
dence—e.g., statements by non-decisionmakers, statements by decisionmakers unrelated to 
the contested employment decision, and other ‘stray remarks’ —there is no consensus on 
what is.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1912 (“Creating two separate methods of analysis 
and drawing the boundary between them based on the characterization of ‘direct’ evi-
dence set up a structure for individual disparate treatment law that proved impossible to 
implement coherently.”). 
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the strength of the plaintiff’s case.”163 Third, the court described the 
“Animus” position, under which “as long as the evidence (whether di-
rect or circumstantial) is tied to the alleged discriminatory animus, it 
need not bear squarely on the challenged employment decision.”164
 In Desert Palace, the Court granted certiorari on two questions: 
whether the direct-evidence requirement applied to Title VII’s statutory 
burden-shifting mechanism and, if so, what the contours of that direct-
evidence requirement should be.165 The Court, however, avoided the 
second question by answering the first question in the negative.166 The 
Court focused on statutory text: § 2000e-2(m) establishes a violation 
“when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.”167 Section 2000e(m) 
defines “demonstrates” to mean meets “the burdens of production and 
persuasion.”168 Other parts of Title VII—including § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), 
which defines the same-decision defense—use the term “demon-
strates,” and there is no indication that the term should include a di-
rect-evidence requirement when used in one provision but not in an-
other.169 Absent a contrary indication in the statute, the Court declined 
to depart from the general practice of permitting proof by both direct 
and circumstantial evidence.170 As the Court explained, “[t]he reason 
for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and 
deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’”171
 As a result, the Desert Palace Court explained, “[i]n order to obtain 
an instruction under § 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present suffi-
cient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice.’”172 But what does this 
requirement actually mean? The description “sufficient evidence to 
find that discrimination was a motivating factor” seems to describe all 
discrimination cases that reach a jury. After all, if there is insufficient 
evidence to justify a jury finding that discrimination was even a motivat-
                                                                                                                      
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See 539 U.S. at 92, 101 n.3. 
166 Id. at 101 n.3. 
167 See id. at 94. 
168 See id. at 98–99. 
169 See id. at 100–01. 
170 See id. at 101. 
171 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100. 
172 Id. at 101. 
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ing factor, then the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.173
 Concededly, the Desert Palace Court appears to have viewed the de-
scription “mixed-motive” as providing a possible boundary for its rul-
ing; it stated in a footnote that “[t]his case does not require us to de-
cide when, if ever, § 107 [the portion of the 1991 Act that enacted 
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)] applies outside of the mixed-
motive context.”174 Desert Palace, therefore, eliminated one sort of line-
drawing (direct versus circumstantial evidence) but left another: mixed-
motive versus single-motive.175 As commentators have noted, nearly all 
discrimination cases could be characterized as mixed-motive cases.176 
Thus, for example, Michael Zimmer predicted soon after Desert Palace 
“that a new, uniform proof structure will evolve from Desert Palace and 
that the approach established in [§ 2000e-2(m)] will apply to almost all 
individual discrimination cases.”177 Henry Chambers has suggested that 
                                                                                                                      
173 See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Dispa-
rate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. Rev. 83, 100 (2004) (“Because allowing a motivating factor 
showing to be made purely through circumstantial evidence makes the showing easier to 
make than (or identical to) a pretext showing, a motivating factor instruction would ap-
pear to be appropriate in every pretext case that survives summary judgment.”). 
174 Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1. 
175 See id. Although both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used under Desert Pal-
ace, courts continue to maintain other boundaries, ruling that some evidence is not closely 
enough linked to the challenged action to show a discriminatory motivation. See, e.g., 
Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1058 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The required causal link renders 
stray remarks, statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers that are 
unrelated to the decisional process insufficient to require a mixed-motive analysis.”). 
176 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 
Ala. L. Rev. 741, 764 (2005) (“There is no logical way to separate cases involving mixed 
motives from cases in which a plaintiff claims that only a single, illegitimate factor moti-
vated the decision without imposing obligations not contemplated by the statute or basic 
rules of civil procedure.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1928 (“Even if courts try to maintain 
a distinction between ‘single-motive’ cases where § 703(m) does not apply and ‘mixed-
motive’ cases where it does, every McDonnell Douglas case turns, at least potentially, into a 
‘mixed-motive’ case once the defendant asserts a nondiscriminatory reason.”). 
177 Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1891; see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 
747 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, D.J., concurring specially) (“There is simply no need to 
retain the McDonnell Douglas paradigm when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively allows a 
court to analyze the evidence to determine if discrimination was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision.”); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and Desert Palace, 41 
Hous. L. Rev. 1549, 1568–69 (2005) (“McDonnell Douglas’s standard of causation . . . is 
higher or more rigorous (harder for a plaintiff to satisfy) than section 703(m)’s motivating 
factor standard. After Desert Palace, a plaintiff cannot be required to satisfy the higher stan-
dard of the pretext analysis.”). 
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Desert Palace increases trial judges’ discretion concerning when to give a 
motivating-factor instruction.178
 Courts have not been eager to conclude that Desert Palace assimi-
lated all Title VII discrimination claims to the § 2000e-2(m) struc-
ture. 179  A number of courts have noted the questions Desert Palace 
raised but have avoided the need to discern the reach of the motivat-
ing-factor framework by concluding that the choice between a burden-
shifting and a burden-retaining proof structure did not affect the case 
before them.180 In the wake of Desert Palace, courts have also confronted 
the question of whether a mixed-motive plaintiff who proffers no direct 
                                                                                                                      
178 See Chambers, supra note 173, at 102 (“[T]he Court is unlikely to develop a specific 
test to tell trial judges when sufficient evidence has been presented to trigger a motivating 
factor instruction. Rather, it will likely leave the evidentiary analysis (and the discretion 
that accompanies it) to trial judges.”). 
179 See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 319 n.5 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (agreeing with courts that “rejected the view that Desert Palace nullified the 
McDonnell Douglas framework”); Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]fter Desert Palace was decided, this Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis in non-mixed-motive cases.”), overruled on other grounds by Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 
546 U.S. 454, 457 (2006). The Fifth Circuit “has adopted . . . a ‘modified McDonnell Doug-
las approach’” that offers mixed-motive analysis as an alternative to pretext analysis. Keelan 
v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2005). Under this modified approach: 
After the plaintiff has met his four-element prima facie case and the defendant 
has responded with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action[,]” the plaintiff must offer evidence “either (1) that the 
defendant’s reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination 
(pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant’s reason, while true, is only 
one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plain-
tiff’s protected characteristic. (mixed-motive[s] alternative). 
Id. (quoting Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
Some courts have asserted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s post-Desert Palace decision in 
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003), demonstrates that the Court contemplates the 
continued use of the McDonnell Douglas framework even after Desert Palace. See, e.g., White v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp. 533 F.3d 381, 400 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[P]ost-Desert Palace, the 
Supreme Court has continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis to summary 
judgment challenges in single-motive Title VII cases.”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009). 
Raytheon, however, concerned an ADA claim and did not discuss § 2000e-2(m). See 540 U.S. 
at 46. 
180 So, for example, the First Circuit recently noted that Desert Palace and McDonnell 
Douglas “have not been definitively disentangled or reconciled.” Chadwick v. WellPoint, 
Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009). The Chadwick court, however, declined to attempt 
such a reconciliation because it concluded that the plaintiff had in any event presented 
evidence that would justify a jury in finding “that the promotion denial was more probably 
than not caused by discrimination.” Id. at 48; see also Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. 
App’x 707, 718 n.11, 2008 WL 5328466 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (“We 
doubt that the Costa Court modified [the McDonnell Douglas] framework because the Court 
did not address or cite McDonnell Douglas in that opinion; however, we need not resolve 
that issue here.”). 
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evidence of discriminatory motive is subject to the McDonnell Douglas 
framework at the summary judgment stage.181 That question, however, 
lies beyond the scope of this Article.182
 In any event, Desert Palace failed to resolve the question of how to 
delineate the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting in cases not 
covered by the statutory burden-shifting framework.183 That, of course, 
was the question on which certiorari was granted in Gross—and which 
the Gross Court avoided by holding Price Waterhouse burden-shifting 
categorically inapplicable in ADEA cases.184
 It seems possible that the decision in Gross was driven by the view 
that Desert Palace lacks any limiting principle. In this regard, it is sugges-
tive that both Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg questioned the mixed-
motive/non-mixed motive dichotomy during the oral argument in 
                                                                                                                      
181 See, e.g., White, 533 F.3d at 400 (reviewing cases and holding that “the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment anal-
ysis of Title VII mixed-motive claims”); see also Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735 (“Desert Palace, a 
decision in which the Supreme Court decided only a mixed motive jury instruction issue, 
is an inherently unreliable basis for district courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s control-
ling summary judgment precedents.”). 
182 Although this question lies beyond the scope of the Article, it seems clear that a 
mixed-motive plaintiff should not be required to demonstrate that the defendant’s stated 
reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona 
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the McDonnell Douglas framework 
to commence its analysis of a mixed-motive claim, but emphasizing that mixed-motive 
plaintiffs are not required to show pretext in order to avoid summary judgment). More-
over, Judge Karen Nelson Moore has argued persuasively that “the purpose of the prima 
facie case” under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework 
is to rule out the most likely legitimate reasons for an adverse employment 
decision. An employee can succeed on a mixed-motive claim, however, even if 
such legitimate reasons played a role in the decision, so long as an illegiti-
mate reason was a motivating factor. Therefore, a different approach is neces-
sary for analyzing mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage. 
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
183 See, e.g., Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1225 n.5, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(declining to decide whether § 2000e-2(m) applies to Title VII retaliation claims, but 
nonetheless holding that the plaintiff could “use circumstantial evidence to establish di-
rectly that retaliatory animus played a motivating part in the [Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission’s] decision to terminate her”); see also B. Glenn George, Revenge, 83 Tul. L. 
Rev. 439, 464 (2008) (“For retaliation claims arising under section 704[,] . . . the 1991 
amendments are inapplicable and the distinction between direct evidence and circumstan-
tial evidence cases apparently remains an open question.”). 
184 The dissenters, by contrast, would have held Price Waterhouse burden-shifting appli-
cable and would have held that no direct evidence requirement circumscribes the avail-
ability of such burden-shifting. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Gross.185 And they were right to question that dichotomy. As a number 
of commentators have suggested, the concept of mixed motives pro-
vides an apt description of many instances of discrimination.186 In any 
case in which the evidence would entitle the jury to find both that the 
employer was motivated by a legitimate reason and that the employer 
was also motivated by bias, it seems fair to argue that the term “mixed 
motive” is apt.187 The “direct evidence,” “animus,” and “animus plus” 
tests all restrained the use of burden-shifting to a subset of these cases; 
but no such limitation seems justified under Desert Palace. 
 The lack of a limiting principle does not in itself counsel against 
adopting the Desert Palace approach. Indeed, one might argue that De-
sert Palace parallels the course taken by five justices in Price Waterhouse, 
given that neither the Price Waterhouse plurality nor Justice White im-
posed any “direct evidence” requirement for the application of the 
burden-shifting framework. But neither those five justices in Price 
Waterhouse, nor the Court in Desert Palace, nor the dissenters in Gross ex-
plained how a district court should proceed to choose between the 
burden-retaining (“determinative factor”) instruction and the burden-
shifting (“motivating factor”) instruction in a given case. 
 William Corbett has argued that under Desert Palace the burden-
retaining instruction should no longer be available; in his view, the 
court should always give a mixed-motive burden-shifting instruction.188 
A number of courts, however, have rejected this view, reasoning that the 
plaintiff should have the option of proceeding under a burden-
                                                                                                                      
185 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 107, at *19 ( Justice Alito: “Do you think 
that there is a tenable distinction between a mixed motives case and a non-mixed motives 
case? In every employment discrimination case that gets beyond summary judgment, 
aren’t there mixed motives at play?”); id. at *20 ( Justice Ginsburg: “Couldn’t—couldn’t 
any Title VII case be presented in either framework?”). 
186 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 176, at 764; Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1928. 
187 The Ninth Circuit, in Desert Palace itself, concluded that “the choice of jury instruc-
tions depends simply on a determination of whether the evidence supports a finding that 
just one—or more than one—factor actually motivated the challenged decision.” Costa v. 
Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); 
see also Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Since it is uncon-
troverted that Marathon has offered two reasons for firing Stegall, yet we hold that the 
record in this case would support a finding that Marathon had illegitimate motives, it is 
logical to examine the case as one involving ‘mixed motives.’”). 
188 Corbett, supra note 177, at 1572–73. (“If one accepts my argument . . . that after 
Desert Palace the standard of causation for all intentional discrimination cases is the moti-
vating factor standard, then the idea that a plaintiff could request a jury instruction on a 
higher standard should not even be entertained.”). 
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retaining framework.189 But when might the plaintiff wish to do so? If 
the burden-retaining and burden-shifting instructions are compared 
strictly as a matter of logic, plaintiffs ought to always prefer the mixed-
motive burden-shifting instruction and defendants ought to always pre-
fer the burden-retaining instruction.190
 It seems fair to assume that defendants will ordinarily follow this 
logic.191 There is evidence to suggest, however, that plaintiffs may not 
always do so.192 Zimmer asserts that “historically Price Waterhouse ‘mixed-
motive’ cases have been treated as somewhat of a ‘third rail’ issue by 
defendants as well as plaintiffs.”193 Assessing the extent to which liti-
gants are likely to try to use Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting frame-
work, Zimmer suggests that lawyers who lack experience with the use of 
a burden-shifting framework may prefer a burden-retaining instruction 
                                                                                                                      
189 See, e.g., Sosa v. Napolitano, 318 F. App’x. 68, 72 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished opin-
ion) (stating in dicta that “a plaintiff who has circumstantial evidence of discrimination 
may choose to proceed under either the mixed-motive theory or the burden shifting 
framework of McDonnell Douglas,” but holding that the plaintiff’s proof failed under either 
theory); White, 533 F.3d at 390 n.4 (“White has presented his failure to promote claim as a 
single-motive discrimination claim brought pursuant only to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
Thus, we do not analyze his claim under the unique mixed-motive summary judgment 
analysis that is appropriate for claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).”); 
Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 453 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting contention that § 2000e-
2(m) provides the sole route for establishing liability because, if so, “an option previously 
open to plaintiffs would be foreclosed without the Congress having spoken to the issue”); 
Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005) (“In respond-
ing to a summary judgment motion in a Title VII disparate treatment case, a plaintiff may 
produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason 
more likely than not motivated the defendant’s decision, or alternatively may establish a 
prima facie case under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”). 
190 Cf. Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 503, 524 
(2008) (“If both options are available to plaintiffs, most—if not all—plaintiffs would likely 
choose the mixed motive theory.”). 
191 Defendants—who already should logically prefer a burden-retaining instruction— 
may additionally fear that articulating any burden-shifting scheme might confuse the jury 
into thinking that the defendant bears the burden of proof on other issues as well. See 
Brill, supra note 80, at 22 (“Often, neither party will request the ‘same decision’ instruc-
tion. The defendant may not want it because it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant 
and it may be confusing.”); Zimmer, supra note 106, at 1942 (“[D]efendants do not relish 
the prospect of ever carrying the burden of persuasion on any issue in a discrimination 
case.”). Judge Brill (a federal magistrate judge) also suggests that if the jury believes that 
the plaintiff has proven that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment 
decision, it is unlikely that the defendant will be able to convince the jury that it would 
have made the same decision anyway. See Brill, supra note 80, at 18–19; see also George 
Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of Proof: Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of 
Employment Discrimination, 1 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 43, 68 (1993). 
192 See Zimmer, supra note 106, 1935–48. 
193 Id. at 1942. 
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because the latter is familiar to them.194 Moreover, plaintiffs litigating a 
Title VII case may “fear the same-decision defense will tempt the jury to 
‘split the baby,’ finding liability under § [2000e-2(m)]’s ‘a motivating 
factor’ standard, but then finding that the defendant proved its same-
decision defense—thereby depriving plaintiff of the most important 
remedies.”195
 It is possible, then, to conclude that under Desert Palace many (or 
most) Title VII discrimination claims could logically be tried under ei-
ther a “determinative factor” instruction or a “motivating factor” in-
struction. When and how should the district court make the choice? At 
a minimum, the choice should be made before closing arguments and 
the final jury instructions. It is interesting to note that the confusion 
over the applicability of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting has been so 
severe in some instances that the trial court was unable to make the 
choice even at that point. Accordingly, the committee that drafted 
model instructions for use in civil cases in the Eighth Circuit has sug-
gested that if a district judge is uncertain whether a case warrants a 
burden-shifting or a burden-retaining instruction, the judge should 
direct the jury to fill out a special verdict form that combines the two 
frameworks.196 The form first asks whether the plaintiff has proven but-
for causation.197 If the answer is yes, then the jury proceeds to assess 
damages; if the answer is no, then the form inquires whether the plain-
tiff has proven that the plaintiff’s protected status was a motivating fac-
tor.198 If the answer is no, then the jury is done; if the answer is yes, 
then the form asks whether the defendant has proven that it would 
have made the same decision anyway.199 If the answer is yes, then the 
jury is done; if the answer is no, then the jury proceeds to assess dam-
ages.200
 The Eighth Circuit suggests this approach only when the trial 
court is uncertain of the appropriate instruction to give.201 These writ-
                                                                                                                      
 
194 Id. (“Given that the vast majority of individual discrimination cases have been 
treated as McDonnell Douglas cases, both defendants and plaintiffs may be reluctant to use 
the mixed-motive analysis because they share the feeling that the known devil of McDonnell 
Douglas is better than the unknown devil of § 703(m).”). 
195 Id. 
196 See 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § 5.92 (2008). 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See id.; see also Hartley v. Dillard’s, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2002) (reject-
ing a challenge to a district court’s use of the special verdict form and noting that “[t]his 
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ten questions can help to avoid the risk that a new trial will be required 
if an appellate court disagrees with the trial court’s judgment over 
which instruction to give. They constitute an ingenious solution to the 
problem of doctrinal uncertainty. But they are not an optimal solution, 
because it is difficult to see how one should explain to the jury the 
purpose of these alternative questions. Ideally, the trial court should be 
put in a position to choose between the burden-retaining and the bur-
den-shifting instruction so as to give only one of those instructions to 
the jury. 
 Moreover, that choice should ideally be made before the start of 
the trial (rather than after the close of the evidence). The parties should 
be permitted to tailor their opening statements and their presentation 
of evidence to the burden framework on which the jury will be in-
structed. Additionally, it is generally useful for the court to give the jury 
some simple preliminary instructions concerning the law that governs 
the claims—a task that will be more straightforward if the burden 
framework has been determined in advance. 
 This does not mean that either party should be obliged to adduce 
their views of the applicable burden framework at the outset of the liti-
gation.202 For one thing, if there do exist some cases in which the evi-
dence could only support a choice between two competing visions of 
the motive for the challenged action—and the evidence would not 
permit a jury to conclude that both motives coexisted—it will ordinarily 
be impossible to discern the applicability of a mixed-motives instruc-
tion until after discovery.203 Thus, it should be open to the plaintiff to 
see how the evidence evolves through discovery before taking a posi-
tion on whether to request a burden-shifting rather than a burden-
retaining instruction. Likewise, although various justices and commen-
tators have referred to the same-decision defense as an “affirmative de-
fense,” this categorization should not be taken to indicate that the de-
                                                                                                                      
jury instruction was designed for use when a case cannot easily be classified as either a 
mixed motive case or a pretext case”). 
202 See, e.g., Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1041 n.7 (“A plaintiff need not decide at the 
outset of the case whether she wishes to pursue a single motive or a mixed-motives theory 
of discrimination.”); Diamond, 416 F.3d at 317 n.3 (“Whether Diamond pled a mixed-
motive claim is irrelevant, however, because ‘a case need not be characterized or labeled at 
the outset. Rather, the shape will often emerge after discovery or even at trial. Similarly, 
the complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the adverse employ-
ment action was taken because of a protected characteristic.’”) (quoting Costa, 299 F.3d at 
856 n.7). 
203 See Stegall, 350 F.3d at 1071 (“[I]t is common to have an employer’s reasons for ter-
minating an employee fleshed out during the course of litigation.”). 
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fendant risks waiver of the defense by failing to raise it in its answer.204 
The term “affirmative defense,” here, is best read as shorthand for the 
view that the burden of proof should rest on the defendant because the 
defendant is best equipped to marshal the relevant evidence.205 Ac-
cordingly, the best approach would seem to be that the parties should 
brief the question of burdens in their pretrial submissions and the trial 
court should designate the applicable burden framework in the final 
pretrial order. If the plaintiff requests, and the court agrees to give, a 
“motivating factor” instruction under Price Waterhouse, then the defen-
dant should be allowed to choose whether or not to request a “same 
decision” instruction.206
 The approach outlined above is far from the only possible way to 
settle the question of when and how the burden choice should be 
made. But it is consistent with the logic of Desert Palace, and it provides a 
structured and predictable framework for the application of that case’s 
guidance.207 Objections might be leveled at this approach; for example, 
                                                                                                                      
 
204 It is, however, advisable to require the defendant to request a same-decision instruc-
tion in its pretrial submissions, so that the plaintiff is alerted to the defendant’s intention 
to frame its defense in this way. But see Fogg, 492 F.3d at 459 (Henderson, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) same-decision defense goes only to remedies and 
thus “need not be raised until the remedy stage of the proceedings”). 
205 See Brill, supra note 80, at 24 (discussing possible views concerning when defendant 
should raise the same-decision defense). 
206 For a case in which the defendant’s choice not to request a same-decision instruc-
tion resulted in a defense verdict, see Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1020, 1021 (9th 
Cir. 2005). In Galdamez, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s 
contention that “the district court failed to give a mixed motive instruction” where the 
court in fact did give a motivating-factor instruction but did not instruct the jury on the 
same-decision defense because the defendant did not request such an instruction. Id. If 
there is no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant would have 
made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive, then the court should not in-
struct on the same-decision defense. See Brill, supra note 80, at 25. As to complexities that 
may arise in cases that involve statutory burden-shifting, see infra note 207. 
207 For claims, such as Title VII claims, to which the statutory same-decision defense 
applies, the question of jury instructions on the same-decision defense is somewhat more 
complicated than it is for cases in which the Price Waterhouse same-decision defense applies. 
In Price Waterhouse cases, the defendant’s decision not to request a same-decision instruc-
tion should clearly be dispositive: if the defendant does not wish the jury to receive that 
instruction, the defendant will have no further opportunity to raise the same-decision de-
fense after a jury verdict for the plaintiff. But what if, in a case covered by § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B), the defendant fails to request a same-decision instruction, the jury finds for 
the plaintiff under the motivating-factor instruction, and the defendant later argues to the 
court that reinstatement is inappropriate under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) because the defen-
dant can “demonstrate” that it would have fired the plaintiff anyway for a nondiscrimina-
tory reason? For a case holding that the district court was free to find facts concerning the 
same-decision argument where the defendant had requested, and the plaintiff had suc-
cessfully opposed, a same-decision jury instruction, see Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 21 
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one might question whether plaintiffs should have the option of choos-
ing between the two frameworks. As noted above, Professor Corbett 
argues that all Title VII discrimination claims should now be litigated as 
mixed motive cases.208 The salient point for current purposes, however, 
is that either the approach this Article suggests or Professor Corbett’s 
approach could be readily administered. Thus, although Gross did re-
move any confusion over when to give a burden-shifting instruction in 
ADEA cases, outlawing the use of burden-shifting in such cases was not 
the only option for addressing confusion over the applicability of bur-
den-shifting. Moreover, a decision to hold burden-shifting categorically 
inapplicable to ADEA (or other) claims has the potential to increase a 
different sort of confusion—that which arises when a jury confronts 
multiple claims that carry varying burdens of proof. 
3. The Possible Impact of Gross on Other Types of Employment Claims 
 The holding in Gross covers only ADEA discrimination claims.209 
But how does the Gross majority’s reasoning affect the availability of 
burden-shifting instructions as to other causes of action? The Gross ma-
jority did not say.210 A preliminary cut at the question might ask to what 
extent the rationales discussed in Part I.A. apply to each type of claim. 
Such an analysis is only a rough cut, of course, because in each instance 
there may be other factors that might make the parallel with the ADEA 
claims addressed in Gross either stronger or weaker. But at least the fac-
tors discussed in Gross provide a starting point. One might chart the 
potential application of the Gross rationales to other claims as shown in 
the following table.211 The rationales discussed in Parts I.A.1 through 
                                                                                                                      
 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Even if the court were to assume that the 1991 Act reserves the ‘same 
action’ defense under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) for the jury, Porter waived any right to a jury 
instruction on that defense when he objected to USAID’s request for that instruction and 
agreed instead to an instruction that asked the jury only to determine liability based on a 
finding of discrimination or retaliation as ‘a motivating factor.’”). In any event, though this 
issue may be challenging, it arises only under the statutory burden-shifting framework. 
Therefore, it is not directly germane to my argument here, because my focus is on the 
administrability of the Price-Waterhouse burden-shifting framework, where this particular 
challenge does not arise. 
208 See Corbett, supra note 177, at 1572–73. 
209 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346. 
210 See id. 
211 The table shows selected claims rather than attempting to list all the possible claims 
that might be affected by Gross. For a sense of the relative frequency of some of the listed 
types of claims, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103, 117 display 6 
(2009). Clermont and Schwab list the frequency of selected types of cases in federal court 
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I.A.4. are listed in the top row, but they are re-ordered to reflect the 
potential breadth of their applicability to other types of claims. 











particular to the 
claim forecloses 
burden-shifting




Title VII retaliation 
claims ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
ADEA retaliation 
claims ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  
Equal Pay Act 
retaliation claims ✔  ✔  ✔  ? 
FLSA retaliation 
claims ✔  ✔  ✔  ? 
FMLA retaliation 
claims ✔  ✔  ✔  ? 
FMLA claims 
 ✔  ✔  (✔ ) ? 
ADA retaliation 
claims (✔ ) ✔  ✔  ? 
ADA claims 
 (✔ ) ✔  (✔ ) ? 
§ 1981 claims 
 ✔  ✔  ✘  ? 
§ 1981 retaliation 
claims ✔  ✔  ✘  ? 
§ 1983 
discrimination claims ✔  ✘  ✘  ✘  
§ 1983 1st Am. 
retaliation claims ✔  ✘  ✘  ✘  
 
a. Inapplicability of Statutory Burden-Shifting 
 One can see that for almost all of the claims listed in the above 
chart the Court would likely conclude (as it did in Gross) that Title VII’s 
statutory burden-shifting scheme is inapplicable, because neither text 
nor legislative history provides stronger support than it did in Gross for 
the application of §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). For example, 
Title VII’s statutory burden-shifting scheme does not refer explicitly to 
Title VII retaliation claims: section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) refers to “a claim 
in which an individual proves a violation under section  2000e-2(m),” 
and § 2000e-2(m) refers to a showing “that race, color, religion, sex, or 
                                                                                                                      
from 1998–2006 as 64,122 Title VII cases, 8240 ADA cases, 8342 § 1983 cases, 7105 ADEA 
cases, 4457 § 1981 cases, and 1503 FMLA cases. Id. 
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national origin was a motivating factor” in an employment practice.212 
Because § 2000e-2(m)’s list of invidious motives does not include re-
taliation, a number of courts have concluded that the statutory burden-
shifting scheme is inapplicable to Title VII retaliation claims.213 ADEA 
retaliation claims, like ADEA discrimination claims, invoke a remedial 
scheme that is distinct from Title VII’s; thus, §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) are inapplicable to ADEA retaliation claims.214
 The only claims in this chart for which a contrary view might be 
taken are claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)— 
but even there, such a view would not be likely to persuade the Su-
preme Court. To understand the effect of the 1991 Act on the ADA, a 
brief outline of the connections between the ADA and Title VII is help-
ful. Congress enacted the ADA in July 1990—after the Court’s 1989 de-
cision in Price Waterhouse but before the passage of the 1991 Act.215  
Then as now, the ADA included the following enforcement provision: 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 
2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title 
shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter 
provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to 
any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in 
violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations prom-
ulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employ-
ment.216
At the time, § 2000e-5 said nothing about motivating-factor analysis; 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) would not be added until 1991.217 Thus, to the ex-
                                                                                                                      
212 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m), e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
213 See, e.g., Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(“[Section] 107(a) of Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not expressly roll back Price Waterhouse’s 
application to retaliation claims.”); McNutt v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“Congress clearly stated its decision to overrule Price Waterhouse only with 
respect to claims under § 2000e-2(m) and did not make a similar provision for retaliation 
claims under § 2000e-3(a).”); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 935 (3d Cir. 
1997) (“[Section] 107 does not apply to retaliation cases.”); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 
680, 684 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[T]he mixed motive provisions of section 107 of the 1991 Act do 
not apply to Title VII retaliation claims brought under section 2000e-3.”). But see Fye, 516 
F.3d at 1225 n.5 (“[W]e have yet to decide whether [§ 2000e-2(m)] actually appl[ies] to 
retaliation cases, and we decline to do so today because we conclude that Ms. Fye has not 
presented evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment.”). 
214 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009). 
215 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
216 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). 
217 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, sec. 107, § 706(g)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991). 
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tent that the 1990 Congress intended the ADA’s enforcement scheme 
to mirror that in Title VII, one might argue that the relevant framework 
for mixed-motive cases would have been that set by Price Waterhouse, un-
der which the same-decision affirmative defense, if established, would 
preclude liability altogether.218
 As noted above, the 1991 Act addressed Price Waterhouse by amend-
ing § 2000e-2 to add, inter alia, subsection 2000e-2(m), which provides: 
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employ-
ment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates 
that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor 
for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated 
the practice.”219 Did this amendment directly affect the ADA? No statu-
tory provision explicitly incorporates Section 2000e-2’s standards into the 
ADA. The 1991 Act, however, also altered § 2000e-5 to add § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B): 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under sec-
tion 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates 
that the respondent would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court—(i) 
may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as pro-
vided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demon-
strated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim 
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award 
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstate-
ment, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subpara-
graph (A).220
 It is unclear how § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) affects ADA claims.221 Be-
cause an ADA violation would not constitute “a violation under section 
2000e-2(m) of this title,” one could argue that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
                                                                                                                      
218 See Flynn, supra note 50, at 2035–36 (“The 100th Congress introduced the first ADA 
bill, Senate Bill 2345, on April 28, 1988—six months before Price Waterhouse was argued 
. . . . The 101st Congress, which would eventually enact the ADA, forged the ADA in a 
legislative crucible in which Price Waterhouse was explicitly an element. Consideration of the 
ADA began on May 9, 1989—eight days after the Supreme Court handed down Price Water-
house . . . .”). 
219 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
220 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
221 See Flynn, supra note 50, at 2044 (arguing that “[i]t would be odd . . . to impute to 
a provision designed to limit remedies the power to create new substantive liability under 
the ADA”). But see Belk v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating 
that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies to ADA claims); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 
470 (4th Cir. 1999) (indicating that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies to ADA claims). 
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simply does not apply to ADA claims. That argument gains some force 
from the fact that the 1991 Act made a number of changes to the ADA 
without explicitly inserting into the ADA a provision similar to § 2000e-
2(m) and without including ADA claims on the list of claims in 
§ 2000e-2(m) itself.222 On the other hand, a strong argument can be 
made that legislators would have understood the new § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) to be among the “powers, remedies and procedures” avail-
able under the ADA. Consider the following passage from a 1991 
House Report on a prior version of the legislation: 
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS MODELED  
AFTER TITLE VII 
 A number of other laws banning discrimination, including 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 
12101 et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S 621, et seq., are modeled after, and have 
been interpreted in a manner consistent with, Title VII. 
 The Committee intends that these other laws modeled after 
Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent 
with Title VII as amended by this Act. For example, disparate 
impact claims under the ADA should be treated in the same 
manner as under Title VII. Thus, under the ADA, once a 
plaintiff makes a prima facie case of disparate impact, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate business 
necessity, using the same standards as under Title VII. This 
was the clear intent of the Committee during its consideration 
of the ADA. 
 Similarly, mixed motive cases involving disability under the ADA 
should be interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all inten-
tional discrimination in Section 5 of this Act. 
 Certain sections of Title VII are explicitly cross-referenced 
in Subsection 107(a) of the ADA, to ensure that persons with 
disabilities have the same powers, remedies and procedures as 
under Title VII. This would include having the same remedies 
and statute of limitations as Title VII, as amended by this Act, 
and by any future amendment. This issue was specifically ad-
dressed by the Committee during its consideration of the 
ADA.223
                                                                                                                      
222 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 107. 
223 H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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In the version of the legislation this House Report describes, it was Sec-
tion 5 of the Act that addressed Price Waterhouse.224 Thus, the House 
Report’s discussion of ADA mixed-motive claims indicates an expecta-
tion that a new statutory burden-shifting scheme would displace Price 
Waterhouse for ADA claims as well as Title VII claims.225
 The Gross court, however, was aware of this passage in the House 
Report—which specifically mentions ADEA claims—and yet did not 
find it persuasive in determining whether to assimilate ADEA claims to 
Title VII’s statutory mixed-motive framework. Justice Stevens’ dissent 
specifically discusses this passage of the House Report and notes that it 
provides “some evidence that Congress intended the 1991 mixed-
motives amendments to apply to the ADEA as well.”226 Nonetheless, 
Justice Stevens concludes that it is “reasonabl[e]” to hold that the statu-
tory burden-shifting structure does not apply to ADEA claims.227
 One might attempt to distinguish ADA claims from ADEA claims 
in two ways. First, one might note that the House Report specifically 
mentions ADA mixed-motive claims.228 Second, the ADA incorporates 
the provisions of § 2000e-5 whereas the ADEA does not.229 It is unclear, 
however, that these arguments would suffice to establish (after Gross) 
that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism applies to ADA claims. 
b. Rejecting Price Waterhouse Removes Authority for Burden-Shifting 
 With respect to many of the claims listed in the chart, it will be 
possible to argue that the Court’s rejection of Price Waterhouse removes 
any decisional support for burden-shifting. Section 1983 claims for First 
Amendment retaliation or for employment discrimination, however, 
will be unaffected by this rationale. Section 1983 provides a cause of 
action to persons claiming that one acting under color of state law vio-
                                                                                                                      
224 As the House Report explained: 
Section 5 of the Act responds to Price Waterhouse by reaffirming that any reli-
ance on prejudice in making employment decisions is illegal. At the same 
time, the Act makes clear that, in considering the appropriate relief for such 
discrimination, a court shall not order the hiring, retention or promoting of a 
person not qualified for the position. 
Id. at 2–3. 
225 See id. at 4. 
226 Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2356 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
227 Id. 
228 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991). 
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). 
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lated their constitutional rights.230 This Article focuses on equal protec-
tion discrimination claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, be-
cause those two types of claims are of central relevance in employment 
discrimination litigation under § 1983. 
 In contrast to all other claims discussed in this Part, the § 1983 
claims discussed here in fact implicate U.S. Supreme Court holdings 
that direct burden-shifting in mixed-motive cases. Indeed, Price Water-
house itself was modeled largely on the burden-shifting scheme set forth 
by the Supreme Court for First Amendment retaliation cases in Mt. 
Healthy.231 Doyle, a teacher, claimed that the school board’s failure to 
renew his contract constituted retaliation for his exercise of First 
Amendment rights.232 Specifically, Doyle had called a local radio station 
to criticize a memorandum from the principal setting a dress code for 
teachers, and the radio station then discussed this dress code on the 
air. 233  When the school board subsequently decided not to rehire 
Doyle, he asked for a statement of reasons.234 The ensuing response 
stated that Doyle displayed “a notable lack of tact in handling profes-
sional matters” and cited two examples: the call to the radio station and 
an incident in which Doyle “used obscene gestures to correct students 
in a situation in the cafeteria.”235
 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below (which had or-
dered Doyle’s reinstatement with back pay). As the unanimous Court 
explained: 
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon re-
spondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally pro-
tected, and that this conduct was a “substantial factor” —or to 
put it in other words, that it was a “motivating factor” in the 
Board’s decision not to rehire him. Respondent having car-
ried that burden, however, the District Court should have 
gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the 
same decision as to respondent’s reemployment even in the 
absence of the protected conduct.236
                                                                                                                      
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009). 
231 See 429 U.S. at 287. 
232 Id. at 276. 
233 Id. at 282. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 282–83 & n.1. 
236 Id. at 287 (citation omitted). 
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The Court reasoned that this same-decision affirmative defense was 
necessary in order to avoid granting a windfall to the plaintiff: 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part . . . in a decision not to rehire, could 
place an employee in a better position as a result of the exer-
cise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have 
occupied had he done nothing.237
The Court further suggested that the defense was necessary in order to 
prevent an employee who merited dismissal from manufacturing a rea-
son to challenge such dismissal: 
A borderline or marginal candidate . . . ought not to be able, 
by engaging in [protected First Amendment] conduct, to pre-
vent his employer from assessing his performance record and 
reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record, 
simply because the protected conduct makes the employer 
more certain of the correctness of its decision.238
 Some two decades later, the Court applied the Mt. Healthy burden-
shifting scheme to a race discrimination challenge to a school’s admis-
sion practices.239 The plaintiff in Texas v. Lesage challenged a university’s 
use of race during the admissions process for a Ph.D. program.240 The 
court of appeals rejected (as irrelevant to liability) the university’s con-
tention that it would have denied Lesage admission even under a co-
lorblind admissions process.241 The Supreme Court—in a unanimous 
per curiam opinion—reversed, holding that the court of appeals’ view 
was “inconsistent with this Court’s well-established framework”: 
Under Mt. Healthy . . . even if the government has considered 
an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the 
plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating 
that it would have made the same decision absent the forbid-
den consideration . . . . Our previous decisions on this point 
have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First 
Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination, but 
that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the 
                                                                                                                      
237 429 U.S. at 285. 
238 Id. at 286. 
239 Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 19, 20–21 (1999) (per curiam). 
240 Id. at 19. 
241 See id. at 20. 
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same: The government can avoid liability by proving that it 
would have made the same decision without the impermissi-
ble motive.242
Given Lesage’s sweeping language, it seems likely that its holding applies 
to race discrimination claims concerning employment as well as those 
concerning school admissions. The Lesage Court did limit its holding by 
specifying that forward-looking claims for injunctive relief are not sub-
ject to the same-decision defense.243 But this limitation is not of con-
cern here because claims for injunctive relief would not ordinarily be 
tried to the jury, and because this Article focuses on whether burden-
shifting instructions should be given to juries. 
c. Statutory Language Governing the Claim Forecloses Burden-Shifting 
 As the chart indicates, a number of types of anti-retaliation claims 
are grounded in statutes containing causation language that uses the 
word “because.” Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits an em-
ployer from “discriminat[ing] against any of his employees . . . because 
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by 
this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this subchapter.”244 The ADEA’s anti-retaliation provision con-
tains similar language,245 as does the ADA’s anti-retaliation provision.246 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)—which protects those bringing complaints un-
der the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) as well as those bringing complaints un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)—makes it unlawful “to dis-
                                                                                                                      
242 Id. at 20–21. “Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental deci-
sion as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the govern-
ment would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury war-
ranting relief under § 1983.” Id. at 21. 
243 See id. at 21 (“Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-conscious pro-
gram and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would re-
ceive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases 
is ‘the inability to compete on an equal footing.’”). 
244 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
245 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting an employer from dis-
criminating against an employee “because such individual . . . has opposed any practice 
made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under 
this chapter”). 
246 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (“No person shall discriminate against any individual 
because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or 
because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”). 
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charge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee be-
cause such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to 
be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has tes-
tified or is about to testify in any such proceeding . . . .”247 The Family 
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) includes an anti-retaliation provision 
featuring language similar to that in the FLSA.248  As to all of these 
claims, the Gross Court’s reasoning concerning the term “because of” in 
the ADEA would seem to apply with equal force. 
 Two types of claims—under the FMLA and the ADA—might not 
be as clearly subject to the same reasoning, but the distinction is not a 
strong one. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) makes it “unlawful for any em-
ployer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any 
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by” the FMLA’s 
leave provisions.249 It might be possible to argue that “for opposing” 
could be read differently than “because.” It seems relatively unlikely, 
however, that much would turn on the distinction between “for oppos-
ing” and “because.” 
 The ADA forbids discrimination “on the basis of” disability, and it 
defines such discrimination to include, inter alia, “limiting, segregating, 
or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects 
the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of 
the disability of such applicant or employee.”250 Does the ADA’s use of 
the term “on the basis of” permit a broader reading than “because of”? 
 To interpret this provision, it is worth comparing its text to the text 
of the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act provides in part: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
                                                                                                                      
247 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2006). 
248 The FMLA “entitles eligible employees to take up to 12 work weeks of unpaid leave 
annually for any of several reasons, including the onset of a ‘serious health condition’ in 
an employee’s spouse, child, or parent.” Nev. Dep’t. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
724 (2003). 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b) makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge or in any 
other manner discriminate against any individual because such individual” has, inter alia, 
filed a charge or instituted a proceeding under the FMLA’s leave provisions. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2615(b) (2006). 
249 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see Richardson v. Monitronics Intern., Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 
335 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding mixed motive analysis applicable to FMLA claim under 
§ 2615(a)). 
250 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(1) (West 2008). 
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eral financial assistance or under any program or activity con-
ducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal 
Service.251
The contrast between this language and that in the ADA suggests that 
the ADA bars discrimination even if the adverse act is not motivated 
solely by the disability. Thus, commentators have argued that the con-
trast in language between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act counsels 
against applying the “solely by reason of” standard to the ADA.252 A 
comparison between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act indicates that 
an ADA plaintiff need not show that the disability was the sole cause of 
the employer’s action. That comparison, however, does not establish 
whether the plaintiff bears the burden of proving but-for causation. 
Here, as in the ADEA, the statutory language includes the term “be-
cause of.” In short, although one might attempt to distinguish the lan-
guage that grounds these FMLA and ADA claims from that analyzed in 
Gross, it is not clear that the Court would find the distinction salient. 
 By contrast, the textual analysis differs dramatically with respect to 
discrimination claims or retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981.253 Section 1981 provides: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the secu-
rity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.254
Although § 1981 does not explicitly address retaliation for the asser-
tion of these rights, the Supreme Court held in CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries that retaliation claims can be brought under § 1981.255 The 
CBOCS Court reasoned as follows: 
                                                                                                                      
251 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
252 See, e.g., Seam Park, Curing Causation: Justifying a “Motivating-Factor” Standard Under 
the ADA, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 257, 267 (2004) (quoting 29 U.S.C § 794 (2000)). 
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
254 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). For a suggested interpretation of this statutory language, see 
Judith Olans Brown et al., Treating Blacks as if They Were White: Problems of Definition and Proof 
in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1975). 
255 See 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008). 
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(1) in 1969, Sullivan [v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 
(1969)] . . . recognized that [42 U.S.C.] § 1982 encompasses a 
retaliation action; (2) this Court has long interpreted §§ 1981 
and 1982 alike; (3) in 1989, Patterson [v. McLean Credit Union, 
491 U.S. 164 (1989)], without mention of retaliation, narrowed 
§ 1981 by excluding from its scope conduct, namely post-
contract-formation conduct, where retaliation would most 
likely be found; but in 1991, Congress enacted legislation [the 
1991 Act] that superseded Patterson and explicitly defined the 
scope of § 1981 to include post-contract-formation conduct; 
and (4) since 1991, the lower courts have uniformly inter-
preted § 1981 as encompassing retaliation actions.256
Section 1981 contains no terms similar to the ADEA’s “because of,” and 
thus nothing in the text of § 1981 forecloses the application of a bur-
den-shifting framework.257 The same is true for § 1983 claims: As the 
Gross Court itself noted, such claims involve no statutory language that 
would foreclose a burden-shifting approach.258
d. The Effect of the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
 Finally, when one considers the Gross Court’s suggestion that the 
1991 Act forecloses the continued application of Price Waterhouse bur-
den-shifting, one finds only two claims to which that assertion seems 
strongly applicable. (Of course, as noted above, this line of reasoning 
seems implausible as to any claims, even those under the ADEA; but, 
for the purpose of predicting Gross’s reach, it is necessary to take the 
contention at face value.) 
 For Title VII retaliation claims, as for the ADEA claims Gross ad-
dressed, it seems relatively uncontroversial to conclude that §§ 2000e-
2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) do not apply. But, as Part I.A.4. discussed, 
the Gross Court took that statutory argument a step further, maintain-
                                                                                                                      
256 Id. at 1957–58. 
257 See Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Em-
ployment, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 329, 371 (2001) (“Although it seems clear that § 1981 plain-
tiffs may rely on a mixed-motive theory to prove discrimination, it is not clear whether the 
pre- or post-1991 rules regarding liability and available remedies will be applied. The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, which changed the mixed-motive proof structure, did not explicitly 
amend § 1981. Most circuits, therefore, continue to hold that a defendant who makes the 
appropriate showing will be excused from both liability and damages.”) (citation omitted). 
258 See 129 S. Ct. at 2352 n.6 (“[T]he constitutional cases such as Mt. Healthy have no 
bearing on the correct interpretation of ADEA claims, which are governed by statutory 
text.”). 
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ing that by failing to encompass ADEA claims within the statutory bur-
den-shifting framework, Congress also foreclosed the application of the 
Price Waterhouse framework.259 Interestingly, when courts have held the 
statutory burden-shifting framework inapplicable to Title VII retaliation 
claims they have tended to conclude from that fact that the Price Water-
house framework applies instead—which demonstrates that the Gross 
Court’s contrary inference is hardly intuitive.260 But, if the Gross major-
ity found this argument persuasive in the context of ADEA discrimina-
tion claims, it seems likely that would also find it so in the context of 
Title VII retaliation claims. For similar reasons, the Gross Court’s con-
tention that the 1991 Act’s statutory burden-shifting provision fore-
closes the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA dis-
crimination claims would seem to apply with equal force to ADEA re-
taliation claims. 
 For all the other claims the chart covers, however, the application 
of this rationale seems more or less questionable. As noted in Part I.A.4, 
the premise for the Gross Court’s contention that Price Waterhouse bur-
den-shifting is foreclosed by the 1991 Act’s statutory burden-shifting 
scheme was that the 1991 Act amended the ADEA without adding to 
the ADEA a statutory burden-shifting framework similar to that in 
§§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).261 That premise is inapplicable 
to FLSA and EPA retaliation claims, because the 1991 Act left the FLSA 
and the EPA untouched.262 Likewise, the 1991 Act neither amended 
§ 1983 nor purported to affect the standards of proof for constitutional 
claims.263
 As to § 1981 claims, the absence of any language in the text of 
§ 1981 that could be read to suggest but-for causation also rebuts the 
contention that the 1991 Act itself forecloses burden-shifting for such 
claims.264 In Gross, the majority viewed the ADEA’s “because of” lan-
guage as clear evidence of a but-for causation standard.265 One can ar-
gue that the Gross majority’s interpretation of the 1991 Act’s effect on 
the ADEA depends in part on the parallel between the “because of” 
                                                                                                                      
259 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
260 See, e.g., McNutt, 141 F.3d at 709 (concluding that statutory burden-shifting does not 
apply to Title VII retaliation claims and noting that “[i]n order to prove a Title VII viola-
tion . . . based on retaliation, Price Waterhouse still requires plaintiffs to establish that the 
alleged discrimination was the ‘but for’ cause of a disputed employment action”). 
261 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
262 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
263 See id. 
264 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
265 See 129 S. Ct. at 2350–51. 
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language in the ADEA and the same “because of” language in Title 
VII.266 That is to say, if the “because of” language so strongly denotes 
but-for causation, then that would constitute a significant part of the 
reason why—in the Gross Court’s view—it was necessary in amending 
Title VII not only to add § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) but also to add § 2000e-
2(m). Seen in that light, the failure to add similar provisions to § 1981 
does not evince a congressional aversion to burden-shifting—it indi-
cates, if anything, the lack of a parallel textual issue with respect to 
§ 1981. 
 Part I.B.3.a. noted that the legislative history of the 1991 Act sug-
gests a view on the part of some legislators that a statutory burden-
shifting mechanism should apply to ADA claims.267 That legislative his-
tory probably would not convince the Court to apply statutory burden-
shifting to such claims. But the history does provide particular reason 
to doubt the applicability of the Gross Court’s further contention con-
cerning the 1991 Act—namely, that the Act provides a reason to fore-
close the application of Price Waterhouse burden-shifting as well. As dis-
cussed above, that argument seems weak even as to the ADEA. But as to 
the ADA, the argument seems particularly dubious. If anything, the 
House Report indicates that at least some legislators wanted to afford 
plaintiffs a more favorable burden-shifting mechanism than that de-
lineated in Price Waterhouse.268 Although those legislators may not have 
succeeded in effecting that change in the text of the statute, it would be 
odd to conclude that the statutory text in fact did the opposite—i.e., 
that it eliminated all burden-shifting for ADA claims (even the more 
limited burden-shifting framework delineated in Price Waterhouse). 
 The argument that the 1991 Act’s burden-shifting framework fore-
closes Price Waterhouse burden-shifting plays out somewhat differently for 
FMLA claims than it did in Gross with respect to ADEA claims. The 
FMLA was not enacted until 1993.269 Prior versions, however, were in-
troduced even before the Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse.270 Indeed, 
precursors of the relevant language— “for opposing” in § 2615(a)(2) 
and “because” in § 2615(b)—can be found both in a bill that was under 
consideration prior to the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, 
and in a bill that was under consideration between the time of that deci-
                                                                                                                      
266 That language in Title VII is currently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
267 See supra notes 212–229 and accompanying text. 
268 See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991). 
269 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3 (1993). 
270 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 18–19 (1993), 1993 WL 30779 (giving history of prior 
versions). 
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sion and the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.271 The relevant lan-
guage, therefore, pre-dated the congressional debates (concerning Price 
Waterhouse) that led to the enactment of the 1991 Act.272 What can be 
inferred from Congress’s failure to include a statutory mixed-motive 
burden-shifting mechanism in the FMLA? On the one hand, it might 
still be argued that Congress knew how to do so and did not— suggest-
ing an intent not to subject FMLA claims to the same sort of mechanism 
set by §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). And, if the line of reason-
ing in Gross is applied (despite the weaknesses identified above in Part 
I.A.4), one might even argue that such a congressional choice indicates 
a desire not to apply Price Waterhouse burden-shifting. On the other 
hand, to the extent that the Gross majority’s inferences depended on the 
fact that Congress amended the ADEA in the 1991 Act without inserting 
a statutory burden-shifting mechanism, the FMLA would be distinguish-
able because it was not at issue in the 1991 Act. 
 Something more can be gleaned from the FMLA’s legislative his-
tory. A Senate report explains that § 2615(a)(2) is modeled on Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision and that § 2615(b) is modeled on the 
FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.273 It might, therefore, be reasonable 
to conclude that Congress intended to incorporate into those sections 
whatever proof framework existed for the claims on which each provi-
sion was modeled. As to § 2615(b), that might lead to the conclusion 
that the 1991 Act ought not to be taken to foreclose application of a 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting mechanism. As to § 2615(a)(2), the 
opposite inference might be drawn from the analysis in Part I.A.1. 
above concerning Title VII retaliation claims. 
 Where does this analysis take us? One can conclude that some 
types of claims—most obviously, § 1983 claims—are unlikely to be af-
fected by Gross. At the other extreme, certain claims—such as retalia-
tion claims under the ADEA or Title VII—seem subject to the ration-
ales applied by the Gross Court; as a result, courts may conclude that 
burden-shifting is no longer available for such claims. Such an outcome 
will be a significant change from prior law, given that at least five cir-
cuits previously viewed Title VII retaliation claims as eligible for bur-
                                                                                                                      
271 See H.R. Rep. No. 100-511, pt. 2, § 107(a)(2), (b) (1988); S. Rep. No. 101-77, at 
§ 107(a)(2), (b) (1989). 
272  See H.R. Rep. No. 100-511, pt. 2, § 107(a)(2), (b); S. Rep. No. 101-77, at 
§ 107(a)(2), (b). 
273 See S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 34, 35 (1993). 
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den-shifting.274 The applicability of Gross is less clear for other types of 
claims, with the result that courts may be uncertain as to the availability 
of burden-shifting.275
 There is, of course, the problem that a mechanical application of 
the Gross rationales to other types of claims may be inappropriate, be-
cause in each instance there may be additional factors—not present in 
Gross—that could change the analysis. The Gross Court’s repudiation of 
Price Waterhouse, however, could affect almost all the claims discussed 
here (although, unless the Court were also inclined to overrule Mt. 
Healthy and Lesage, it would not affect § 1983 claims). 
 In sum, although Gross simplified the analysis of ADEA discrimina-
tion claims (by holding burden-shifting categorically inapplicable) 
Gross cannot be said to have simplified the landscape of employment 
discrimination generally. Gross will cause a period of uncertainty con-
cerning the availability of burden-shifting for other types of claims. 
What does seem clear is that, as the Gross dissenters noted, the decision 
will increase the likelihood that when multiple claims are tried to-
gether, two different burden frameworks will apply.276
4. Confusion When Multiple Claims Are Subject to Different 
Frameworks 
 Many employment discrimination cases involve more than one 
type of claim.277 A plaintiff might allege a Title VII retaliation claim in 
                                                                                                                      
 
274 See, e.g., Fye, 516 F.3d at 1225 & n.5 (noting availability of mixed-motive framework 
for Title VII retaliation claims, but declining to decide whether § 2000e-2(m) applies to 
such claims); Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Price 
Waterhouse framework to a Title VII retaliation claim); Kubicko, 181 F.3d at 546 (same); 
Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e analyze ADA 
retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising un-
der Title VII . . . . This framework will vary depending on whether the suit is character-
ized as a ‘pretext’ suit or a ‘mixed motives’ suit.”); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 685 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (applying Price Waterhouse framework to a Title VII retaliation claim); see also 
George, supra note 183 at 462–63 (“[T]he Price Waterhouse approach presumably remains 
good law in considering retaliation cases . . . .”). But see Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 
526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Price Waterhouse standard does not apply to 
retaliation claims.”). 
275 For some of the claims discussed here, burden-shifting may not have been a wide-
spread practice even before Gross. In particular, it appears that no court of appeals has 
held Price Waterhouse burden-shifting applicable to EPA retaliation claims or FLSA retalia-
tion claims. 
276 See Katz, supra note 16, at 868 (discussing the “practical benefits” —including for 
jury instructions—of an approach that treats claims under different statutes the same way). 
277 This fact is evident in sources that list the percentage of employment discrimina-
tion cases that include various types of claims: when one sums the percentages, they 
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addition to her Title VII discrimination claim. A race discrimination 
plaintiff might sue under both Title VII and § 1981.278 A government 
employee might bring a § 1983 claim as well as a Title VII claim or 
§ 1981 claim.279 To the extent that different claims are subject to dif-
ferent burden-of-proof frameworks, a jury might be asked to decide 
one claim under a burden-retaining instruction and another under a 
burden-shifting instruction. 
 As an example, consider Title VII retaliation claims. Judging from 
filings with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”),280 Title VII plaintiffs are bringing retaliation claims with in-
creasing frequency: the percentage of EEOC filings that included Title 
VII retaliation claims rose from roughly 20% in fiscal year 1997 to 
roughly 30% in fiscal year 2008.281 It seems fair to infer both that law-
                                                                                                                      
 
amount to well over 100%. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Mac-
roeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 709, 
715 tbl. 1 (1993) (reporting data from an American Bar Foundation survey of employment 
civil rights cases filed in seven federal district courts from 1972 to 1987 and listing percent-
age of cases featuring, inter alia, Title VII claims (75.5%); § 1981 claims (33.1%); § 1983 
claims (13.6%); and ADEA claims (10.3%)). 
278 Theodore Eisenberg and Stewart Schwab “examined the courthouse record in 
every § 1981 case filed in fiscal 1980–81 in the Central District of California, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern District of Georgia.” Theodore Eisenberg & 
Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 596, 598 (1988). They 
found 
considerable but not complete overlap between title VII and section 1981. In 
1980–81 in the three districts, plaintiffs filed 321 complaints of racial dis-
crimination in employment. Two hundred seventy (84%) filed a title VII 
claim. Of the title VII claims, almost one-half (133) also had a section 1981 
claim. 
Id. at 602–03 (citation omitted). 
279 For example, in their study of § 1981 cases filed in fiscal 1980–81, Eisenberg and 
Schwab found that of forty-one cases that involved claims under § 1981 but not Title VII, 
“[e]leven of these cases were brought against government defendants and also relied on 
section 1983.” Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 278, at 603. 
280 EEOC charge filings are of course an indirect measure of the relative frequency of 
various types of claims in lawsuits, because most charges filed with the EEOC do not result 
in lawsuits. As a rough point of comparison, in fiscal year 2007 the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts reports that 13,375 “employment” civil rights suits were filed and 665 “ac-
commodations” civil rights suits were filed. See 2007 Judicial Facts and Figures, at tbl. 4.4, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2007.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). The 
EEOC reports that over 75,000 charges were filed with it in every fiscal year from 1997 
through 2007. See U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Charge Statistics FY 1997 
Through FY 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2009). 
281 See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2008, supra note 280. The absolute num-
ber of Title VII retaliation charges also rose, from 16,394 in fiscal year 1997 to 28,698 in 
fiscal year 2008. Id.; see also George, supra note 183, at 441 (“Retaliation charges filed with 
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suits involving retaliation claims are rising in frequency and that plain-
tiffs are combining discrimination and retaliation claims relatively of-
ten.282 For example, one study of reported opinions on racial harass-
ment claims found that in almost half of the cases studied the plaintiff 
also asserted a retaliation claim.283 In some subset of the cases that in-
volve both discrimination and retaliation claims, both types of claims 
will survive motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of 
law and will be submitted to a jury. 
 How will the court instruct the jury in such cases? For the Title VII 
discrimination claim, the statutory burden-shifting mechanism will be 
potentially available. As noted in Part I.B.3.a., a number of courts will 
treat the Title VII retaliation claim differently, holding that the statu-
tory burden-shifting mechanism is unavailable.284 Nonetheless, prior to 
Gross, it seemed clear that in some cases the Price Waterhouse burden-
shifting mechanism would be available for the retaliation claim— al-
though the availability of such burden-shifting might depend on the 
uncertain doctrinal contours discussed above in Part I.B.2.285 In some 
of these double-claim trials, the jury would receive relatively consistent 
causation instructions on the two claims, in the sense that a motivating-
factor instruction would be provided on each claim. The nature of the 
same-decision defense would, of course, differ as between the Title VII 
discrimination claim, where the same-decision defense would go only 
to remedies under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), and the Title VII retaliation 
claim, where the same-decision defense would go to liability under Price 
                                                                                                                      
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the enforcement agency for 
Title VII, have been steadily rising, doubling in the last fifteen years.”); Laura Beth Nielsen 
& Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litiga-
tion as a Claiming System, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 663, 690 & fig. 1 (reviewing EEOC charge filing 
data from 1992 to 2002 and observing that “[t]wo types of discrimination clearly rise in 
prominence over the period: retaliation, which grows from 15.3% of individual complaints 
to 27.5% of individual complaints, and disability”). 
282 Nielsen and Nelson, noting the rise in retaliation claims during the period from 
1992 to 2002, posit “an increasing tendency for plaintiffs (and their lawyers) to add retalia-
tion as a claim in discrimination disputes” as one possible reason for the rise, but also list 
other possible reasons and caution that they lack the data to draw a conclusion. Nielsen & 
Nelson, supra note 281, at 690. 
283 Pat Chew and Robert Kelley studied 260 opinions in racial-harassment cases from 
six circuits during the years up to and including 2002. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, 
Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 49, 53–54 (2006). They 
found that the plaintiffs in nearly half (49.2%) of the cases also asserted retaliation claims. 
Id. at 80, tbl. 11. Although the study encompassed § 1981 claims and § 1983 claims as well 
as Title VII claims, 87.7% of the cases involved Title VII claims. Id. 
284 See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 108–208 and accompanying text. 
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Waterhouse. But at least the starting point—the motivating-factor in-
struction—would be parallel. 
 The analysis in Part I.B.3. provides some reason to wonder whether 
courts will continue to apply Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to Title VII 
retaliation claims, because all the rationales relied upon by the Gross 
Court with respect to ADEA discrimination claims seem to apply with 
equal force to Title VII retaliation claims.286 But before courts extend 
Gross to Title VII retaliation claims, it would make sense for them to 
consider whether such an extension truly serves the interests articu-
lated by the Court in Gross.287 Although the Gross Court’s concern that 
burden-shifting instructions are inherently confusing seems unsup-
ported,288 it is worthwhile to consider the costs of confusion that will 
arise from giving jurors a burden-shifting instruction on one claim 
while giving them a burden-retaining instruction on the other. Such 
contrasting instructions do seem potentially confusing, and it seems fair 
to predict that they will be given more often if Gross is extended to Title 
VII retaliation claims.289  
 Other permutations of the problem will arise. In some cases, a 
plaintiff may assert a Title VII discrimination claim and an ADEA dis-
crimination claim.290 After Gross, this pairing will predictably result in 
contrasting causation instructions whenever the Title VII discrimina-
tion claim qualifies for the statutory burden-shifting mechanism.291 In 
other cases, § 1981 claims may be paired with Title VII discrimination 
claims or with § 1983 discrimination claims.292 As was previously noted, 
                                                                                                                      
 
286 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
287 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. 
288 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text. 
289 I say “more often” advisedly, because even if the same approach were to apply to 
both Title VII discrimination claims and Title VII retaliation claims, it would still be theo-
retically possible for a burden-shifting instruction to be given on one claim and a burden-
retaining instruction to be given on the other. So long as the relevant scheme is one in 
which not all cases qualify for a burden-shifting instruction, there may exist fact patterns 
that justify a burden-shifting instruction for one claim but not for the other. 
290 For rough evidence that this pairing sometimes occurs in actual litigation, I ran the 
following search in the U.S. District Courts Cases (“DCT”) database on Westlaw: ASSERT! 
/S “TITLE VII” /S ADEA. As of August 3, 2009, the search retrieved 865 documents. 
291 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Were the Court truly worried 
about difficulties faced by trial courts and juries, moreover, it would not reach today’s deci-
sion, which will further complicate every case in which a plaintiff raises both ADEA and 
Title VII claims.”). 
292 See Grossman, supra note 257, at 377–78 (describing her “review of all district court 
decisions within the Second Circuit in 1999 and 2000, in which a § 1981 claim is raised” 
and reporting that “[s]ixty-nine percent of the cases including a § 1981 claim also in-
cluded a Title VII claim. Section 1981 claims were also coupled with § 1983 claims (31%), 
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Title VII discrimination claims are eligible for statutory burden-
shifting.293 Section 1983 discrimination claims are eligible for burden-
shifting instructions under Mt. Healthy, and as Part I.B.3 discussed, 
there is no reason to think that Gross will change that.294 As Part I.B.3 
also notes, two of the key rationales relied upon in Gross do not apply to 
§ 1981 claims, and thus there is reason to doubt that Gross will be ex-
tended to such claims.295 From the perspective of jury comprehension, 
that seems like a good thing in light of the overlap in some cases be-
tween § 1981 claims and either Title VII or § 1983 claims. 
* * * 
 This Part noted that the Gross Court adduced four rationales in 
support of its conclusion that burden-shifting on causation is impermis-
sible under the ADEA. By revisiting those rationales briefly, one can see 
that three of them support the result in Gross only if one accepts the 
view that the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting approach has been dis-
credited. Take first the Court’s argument that the ADEA’s language 
forecloses burden-shifting; Price Waterhouse addressed materially similar 
language in Title VII and reached the opposite conclusion. Next, take 
the Court’s conclusion that the statutory burden-shifting mechanism 
does not apply to ADEA cases; although reasonable, this argument does 
not in itself foreclose the application of the non-statutory Price Water-
house burden-shifting. Admittedly, one rationale in Gross stands inde-
pendent of the merits of Price Waterhouse: If the Gross Court were correct 
that the 1991 Act itself forecloses the continued application of Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting for claims other than Title VII discrimina-
tion claims, that conclusion would support the result in Gross even if 
Price Waterhouse were not otherwise discredited. However, as discussed 
in Part I.A.4, it seems implausible that the 1991 Act was meant to fore-
close Price Waterhouse burden-shifting for ADEA claims.296 And, as noted 
in Part I.B.3, such an argument is even less plausible when applied to a 
number of other types of employment discrimination claims.297
                                                                                                                      
§ 1985 claims (18%), and related state law claims (29%)”). Professor Grossman points out 
that “[w]here plaintiffs are protected by both Title VII and § 1981, the latter may be used 
to hold the individual discriminator liable.” Id. at 378. 
293 See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. 
294 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
295 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text. 
297 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
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 In sum, the majority in Gross adduced one implausible rationale 
and two other rationales that depend (for their force) on the view that 
Price Waterhouse has been discredited. And the Gross Court’s central 
support for the proposition that the Price Waterhouse approach has been 
discredited was the assertion that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes 
confusion. Part I.B. examined this assertion in detail.298 Part I.B.1 ar-
gued that the Gross Court failed to adduce persuasive support for the 
proposition that burden-shifting instructions are inherently confusing 
to juries.299 To the extent that Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes 
confusion, it suggested that the relevant confusion arises from two 
other sources. As Part I.B.2 noted, much of the confusion arises from 
the Court’s failure to provide clear guidance to district courts concern-
ing how to tell when to use a burden-shifting instruction (as opposed to 
a burden-retaining instruction).300 Part I.B.3 observed that a different 
sort of confusion arises when more than one claim is sent to the jury 
and the causation instructions on one claim differ from those on the 
other.301
 When considered as rationales for repudiating the twenty-year-old 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting practice, these concerns over confusion 
are at best a wash. It is true that Gross removed confusion over burden-
shifting in the ADEA context, but outlawing burden-shifting was not 
the only available option for addressing concerns over trial-court con-
fusion. Meanwhile, the decision in Gross will increase uncertainty, at 
least in the short term, concerning the availability of burden-shifting 
for various other employment discrimination claims. But despite this 
uncertainty, it does seem clear that the holding in Gross will increase 
the likelihood that cases will be tried to juries on multiple claims that 
carry different burden frameworks. I therefore suggest that—at least 
when one takes the arguments offered on the face of the opinion—the 
Gross majority failed to carry its burden of showing that Price Waterhouse 
should be abandoned. 
II. Gross and Policy Considerations 
 Part I asserted that the reasoning in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc. fails to satisfy.302 The Court’s arguments based on statutory text and 
                                                                                                                      
298 See supra notes 75–301 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 79–107 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 108–208 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 209–275 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 23–301 and accompanying text. 
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concerns about judicial administration do not provide persuasive 
grounds for abandoning Price Waterhouse burden-shifting. Is it possible 
that members of the Court were motivated in part by unstated assump-
tions concerning the realities of employment discrimination litigation? 
Were they responding to concerns that discrimination claims generally 
are too easy to assert, or too readily won? Were they proceeding from a 
view that age discrimination claims, in particular, warrant more restric-
tive treatment? No suggestion of such reasoning appears on the face of 
the majority opinion (although a stray remark by Justice Alito at oral 
argument suggests that some of these considerations might have 
crossed the mind of at least one justice).303 Nor, in fact, does Justice 
Stevens’s dissent resort to any countervailing assertions concerning the 
challenges faced by discrimination plaintiffs.304 Justice Breyer, writing 
for three justices, did argue that information asymmetries support the 
application of burden-shifting.305 But apart from that suggestion, the 
opinions in Gross are strikingly devoid of references to the dynamics of 
employment discrimination litigation. 
 This Part briefly surveys the rich literature concerning those dy-
namics and their implications for the choice among burden frame-
works. To illustrate the (perhaps obvious) point that such choices have 
been influenced by justices’ views of the merit and dynamics of litiga-
tion concerning the relevant claim, Part II first recounts, in Part II.A., 
evidence from the files of Justice Blackmun concerning the develop-
ment of the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework.306 Part II.B. surveys 
data that might bear upon the calibration of employment discrimina-
tion litigation today.307 If, as Justice O’Connor suggested during the 
deliberations on Price Waterhouse, the choice of a burden-shifting ap-
proach is “neither required by, nor prohibited by” the language of the 
relevant statutes, what considerations might one weigh in determining 
how best to further the goals of the statutory scheme?308 In this regard, 
                                                                                                                      
 
303 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2346–52 (2009); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 108, at *47 ( Justice Alito: “[I]sn’t age more closely correlated with 
legitimate reasons for employment discrimination than race and other factors that are 
proscribed by Title VII?”). 
304 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
305 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
306 See infra notes 310–342 and accompanying text. 
307 See infra notes 343–399 and accompanying text. 
308 Memorandum from Justice O’Connor to Justice Brennan, supra note 138. For a 
question premised on a similar possibility, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
108, at *46 ( Justice Kennedy: “Let’s—let’s assume we have authority to incorporate the 
Title VII jurisprudence into the ADEA area as a matter of choice. Are there reasons why 
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it is also worth noting the circumscribed nature of the question as 
framed by both the Price Waterhouse and the Gross Courts: in each in-
stance, the choice is seen as whether or not to shift the burden on li-
ability, and in both instances, the most plaintiff-friendly position is one 
that gives the defendant a complete defense to liability. Part II.C. 
broadens the focus to acknowledge proposals for a more extensive re-
orientation of the burden framework.309
A. Mining Mt. Healthy 
 An examination of mixed-motive burden-shifting in the late 1970s 
reveals that the test began its Supreme Court career as a test favored by 
justices seeking to curb constitutional claims. 
 As many commentators have observed, the Price Waterhouse Court 
drew the idea of burden-shifting from prior decisions in other contexts, 
most prominently from the Court’s 1977 decision in Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle.310 As noted above, Doyle was a 
schoolteacher who brought a First Amendment retaliation claim after 
the school district failed to renew his teaching contract.311 The first of 
the “questions presented” in Mt. Healthy shows why this case involved a 
question of mixed motives: 
Whether a Board of Education can be forced to give a con-
tinuing contract to a non-tenured teacher it considers too 
immature for the position, if one of the many factors on 
which the Board’s decision is based is a telephone call to a lo-
cal radio station, such call allegedly being within the First 
Amendment rights of the teacher?312
                                                                                                                      
there should be distinctions between the two regimes? . . . Are there reasons of admini-
stration or fairness . . . [?]”). 
309 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text. 
310 See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition II: Price Waterhouse and the Indi-
vidual Employment Discrimination Case, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 1023, 1035 (1990) (“The Mt. 
Healthy precedent influenced the Price Waterhouse opinions in the Supreme Court and in 
the courts below, and the arguments of the parties. Despite all this attention, none of the 
Justices examined whether it was appropriate to apply Mt. Healthy at all as a precedent 
under Title VII.”). For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of causation issues in 
Title VII class actions, see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title 
VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292, 302–04 (1982). 
311 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977). 
312 Brief for the Petitioner at *4, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278), 1976 WL 
194371. 
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 Mt. Healthy was a complex case that presented a range of unsettled 
issues for the Court’s decision. Before even reaching the merits of the 
case, the Court had to resolve a question concerning the amount-in-
controversy requirement,313 a claim that the school board was not a 
“person” for purposes of § 1983,314 and an assertion of sovereign im-
munity.315 Thus, the question of burden-shifting was not the only focus 
of debate among the justices.316 Nonetheless, the evidence in Justice 
Blackmun’s case file is informative; it suggests that some justices’ views 
of the burden-shifting question were informed by their assumptions 
about Doyle’s claim in particular and the merits of such claims more 
generally. 
 Notes by Justice Blackmun dated prior to the argument in Mt. 
Healthy suggest that he sympathized with Doyle’s employer: 
It seems to me that Doyle’s general behavior, wholly apart from 
the incidental radio station factor, hardly merited renewal of 
his contract. Seemingly, he could get along with neither the 
authorities, the help, nor the students, and was frequently 
driven to apologies for his actions. Giving such emphasis to the 
one radio station incident . . . almost manufactures a property 
interest in his job.317
The evidence in the case included a statement explaining the school 
board’s decision not to renew the contract; the statement not only cited 
Doyle’s “lack of tact” but also complained about Doyle’s call to a local 
radio station: “You assumed the responsibility to notify W.S.A.I. Radio 
                                                                                                                      
313 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 277 (holding that “it was far from a ‘legal certainty’ at 
the time of suit that Doyle would not have been entitled to more than $10,000”). 
314 See id. at 278–79 (avoiding this contention on the grounds that it was belatedly 
raised and non-jurisdictional). As it turned out, the Court would revisit the question of 
municipal liability under § 1983 relatively soon. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
315 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280–81 (“[A] local school board such as petitioner is 
more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the State. We therefore hold that it was 
not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in the federal 
courts.”). 
316 Justice Blackmun’s notes indicate that much of the discussion in conference fo-
cused on the question of whether the school board counted as a “person” under § 1983, 
with some justices suggesting that the Court dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted 
and others objecting, and with some discussion of whether the case should be re-listed for 
argument along with Monell v. Department of Social Services. See Conference notes of Justice 
Blackmun (Nov. 5, 1976) (on file with author). Citations to internal memoranda and other 
internal Court documents concerning Mount Healthy are to items in Box 245 of the Papers 
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. 
317 Memorandum signed “H.A.B” at 4 (Sept. 1, 1976) (on file with author). 
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Station in regards to the suggestion of the Board of Education that 
teachers establish an appropriate dress code for professional people. 
This raised much concern not only within this community, but also in 
neighboring communities.”318 Justice Blackmun’s notes might be read 
to suggest an impulse to commiserate with the defendant over the exis-
tence of this evidence: “Of course, had the principal received adequate 
legal advice before he responded to the request for reasons, his re-
sponse would have been very different.”319
 Justice Blackmun’s conference notes suggest that the justices 
crafted the Mt. Healthy burden-shifting standard with instrumental 
goals in mind. For instance, Justice Blackmun’s handwritten notes con-
cerning Chief Justice Burger’s remarks include a notation that could 
fairly be interpreted as reading “harmless error approach to avoid end-
less litigation.”320 In a memo dated a few days after the conference, Jus-
tice Rehnquist presumably referred to that discussion when he 
stated:“[I]f there were a majority to follow the views advanced by the 
Chief, calling it ‘harmless error,’ or by Potter and me, saying that we 
would require a ‘but for’ causation in order to sustain a First Amend-
ment claim, I would vacate and remand on the merits.” 321  Justice 
Blackmun responded with a memo stating in part: “I could participate 
in an approach on ‘but for’ causation. This, in fact, might clear the at-
mosphere for situations that are cluttered by a secondary First Amend-
ment claim.”322
 The justices also engaged in negotiations concerning the wording 
of the causal test in Mt. Healthy. Writing in response to a draft circulated 
by Justice Rehnquist, Justice Marshall stated that he was “somewhat 
troubled by aspects of the penultimate paragraph.”323 Justice Marshall 
agreed that Doyle “must prove more than that the school board was 
aware of [the call to the radio station], or that they discussed it in mak-
ing the decision not to renew the contract.”324 He continued, “[I]n my 
view, plaintiff must prove that his constitutionally protected activity ac-
                                                                                                                      
318 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283 n.1. 
319 Memorandum signed “H.A.B,” supra note 317, at 4. 
320 See Conference notes of Justice Blackmun, supra note 316. A literal transcription of 
the handwritten notes would read: “H E approach t avoid endless liti.” Id. 
321 Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to the Conference 4 (Nov. 9, 1976) (on file 
with author). 
322 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to the Conference (Nov. 10, 1976) (on file 
with author). 
323 Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Rehnquist (Dec. 13, 1976) (on file 
with author). 
324 Id. 
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tually played a role in (i.e., was one of the reasons for) the decision not 
to renew his contract.”325 If Doyle met this burden, Justice Marshall as-
serted, the school board should then be required to prove that it would 
have made the same decision “in any event.”326 Justice Marshall’s con-
cern stemmed from the draft’s wording, which he appeared to view as 
placing a greater burden on the plaintiff. As Justice Marshall wrote, 
“the terms ‘substantial factor’ and ‘significant role’ are at least ambigu-
ous, and it would be much easier for me to join if you were able to clar-
ify the relevant paragraph along the lines I’ve suggested.”327
 Justice Marshall evidently succeeded in convincing Justice Rehn-
quist to soften the relevant language by adding the phrase “motivating 
factor.”328 The next day Justice Rehnquist circulated a second draft, 
which stated in relevant part that “the burden was properly placed 
upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally pro-
tected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ —or, to put it in 
other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not 
to rehire him.”329 One finds this formulation, in substantially similar 
form, in the published opinion.330
 Justice Rehnquist also took the opportunity to link the Mt. Healthy 
burden-shifting standard to the standard enunciated, in passing, by the 
Court in 1977 in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp.331 Justice Rehnquist’s memorandum responding to Justice 
Marshall recognized that “the draft opinion may not be a model of clar-
ity” concerning the plaintiff’s burden.332 Justice Rehnquist continued: 
Lewis’ Arlington Heights opinion has something of the same 
problem in it, and I understand he is making some revisions 
in its language. When I see what he recirculates, I will try to 
sharpen up the paragraph to which you refer in order to ac-
commodate your view and make it consistent with the corre-
sponding part of his draft.333




328 Second draft at 12, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (No. 75-1278), circulated Dec. 14, 
1976. 
329 Id. (citation omitted). 
330 See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. 
331 See 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Marshall 
(Dec. 13, 1976) (on file with author). 
332 Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to Justice Marshall, supra note 331. 
333 Id. 
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 In Arlington Heights, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to the village’s denial of rezoning, reasoning 
that the plaintiffs “failed to carry their burden of proving that discrimi-
natory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village’s decision.”334 At 
this point, the Arlington Heights opinion has a footnote that cites Mt. 
Healthy and states: 
Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by 
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have 
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof 
would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of es-
tablishing that the same decision would have resulted even 
had the impermissible purpose not been considered.335
The footnote was, of course, dictum, because the Court held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden in this case.336
 Why was this dictum included? The footnote did not appear in Jus-
tice Powell’s first draft of the Arlington Heights opinion.337 But by the 
time Justice Powell circulated a revised first draft, a new “note 21” had 
been added.338 Justice Blackmun’s files contain a memorandum (pre-
sumably from one of Justice Blackmun’s clerks) expressing doubt about 
the change: 
I do not think the dictum in note 21, added following page 
17, is advisable. Perhaps Justice Powell would be willing to re-
word the footnote to reserve the question as not presented for 
decision in this case. If Mt. Healthy is correct (which I think it 
is), its test of causation could well be different because the 
first amendment is concerned with effect more than motiva-
tion. The distinction is not perfect, but there is enough of a 
difference that I would wait for a case in which the issue is 
                                                                                                                      
334 429 U.S. at 270. 
335 Id. at 270–71, 271 n.21. 
336 See id. at 270. 
337 See generally First Draft Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977) (No. 75-616), circulated Dec. 2, 1976. Citations to internal memoranda 
and other internal Court documents concerning Arlington Heights are to items in Box 240 
of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. In that first draft, there is a text sentence that 
is similar (but not identical) to the relevant text sentence in the opinion as published. The 
first draft states: “Respondents simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discrimi-
natory purpose was a substantial factor in the Village’s decision.” Id. at 17. No footnote is 
appended to this sentence. Id. 
338 See Memorandum signed RKW (Dec. 13, 1976) (on file with author). 
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presented before applying the Mt. Healthy test to racial dis-
crimination under the 14th amendment.339
Notes on this memorandum, in what appears to be Justice Blackmun’s 
handwriting, indicate that Justice Blackmun took the matter up with 
Justice Powell: “LP says PS - WHR insist—12–13–76 I told him I would 
prefer to omit, but would not depart if included I suggested a See cite 
to Mt. Healthy & that both cases come down the same day.”340
 From this evidence, it seems fair to infer that the reference to the 
same-decision defense in footnote 21 of the Arlington Heights opinion 
was urged upon Justice Powell by Justices Stewart (“PS”) and Rehnquist 
(“WHR”). Despite Justice Blackmun’s request that the footnote be 
omitted, it remained in the opinion; but his suggestion that the two 
opinions be released on the same day was implemented. 
 In Mt. Healthy, then, some justices favored the same-decision de-
fense as a way to “avoid endless litigation” or to clear away “secondary” 
retaliation claims that were viewed as “clutter.”341 At least some com-
mentators viewed the Court’s endorsement of that defense as a pro-
employer move.342 In Arlington Heights, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist 
evidently sought the inclusion of a same-decision defense in footnote 
21—perhaps because they saw such a defense as a desirable backstop 
against race-discrimination equal protection claims. 
B. Calibrating Employment Litigation 
 The Gross Court’s opinion was remarkable for its failure to discuss 
the body of work debating the merits of burden-shifting in employment 
discrimination cases. Even an abbreviated review of that literature 
                                                                                                                      
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 Memorandum from Justice Blackmun to the Conference, supra note 322; Confer-
ence notes of Justice Blackmun, supra note 316. 
342 Thus, for instance, Justice Blackmun’s file on Mt. Healthy includes a law professor’s 
letter warning that “the holding in Mt. Healthy . . . and note 21 in the Village of Arling-
ton Heights case . . . contain enormous potential for damaging the cause of protecting 
Constitutional rights.” Letter from Professor Benjamin M. Schieber to Justice Blackmun 
(Mar. 8, 1977) (on file with author). For a more recent assessment of Mt. Healthy, see, e.g., 
Joseph O. Oluwole, On the Road to Garcetti: ‘Unpick’Erring Pickering and Its Progeny, 36 
Cap. U. L. Rev. 967, 990 (2008) (“The problem with sanctioning ‘mixed motives’ and the 
‘same decision anyway’ affirmative defense is that it empowers employers to concoct post-
hoc, multiple motives other than the employee’s free speech as justification for a termina-
tion, recasting what is actually a ‘single motive’ case as a pretextual ‘mixed motives’ case. 
Thus, Mount Healthy effectively strengthened the interests of public employers, relative to 
that of employees, in the Pickering [v. Board of Education] calculus.”). 
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(which is all that space permits here) reveals the range of policy con-
siderations that might have been—but were not—addressed in the 
Gross Court’s opinion. Justice Stevens’s dissent in Gross resembles the 
majority’s opinion in one respect: he eschewed any reliance on policy 
arguments concerning burden-shifting.343 Instead, he rebutted the ma-
jority’s statutory and doctrinal arguments and decried what he termed 
the majority’s “unabashed display of judicial lawmaking.” 344  Justices 
Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’s dissent, but they 
also wrote separately to adduce policy rationales for retaining Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting in areas not covered by Title VII’s statutory 
burden-shifting mechanism.345 Their rationales can provide a starting 
point for our discussion. 
 Justice Breyer pointed out that determining motivation in an em-
ployment discrimination case differs from determining causation in a 
tort case involving purely physical events: 
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but-
for” causation. In that context, reasonably objective scientific 
or commonsense theories of physical causation make the con-
cept of “but-for” causation comparatively easy to understand 
and relatively easy to apply. But it is an entirely different mat-
ter to determine a “but-for” relation when we consider, not 
physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that 
constitute motive. Sometimes we speak of determining or dis-
covering motives, but more often we ascribe motives, after an 
event, to an individual in light of the individual’s thoughts 
and other circumstances present at the time of decision.346
Justice Breyer’s reference to “ascribing” motives calls to mind Professor 
Mark Brodin’s observation that “issues of causation frequently involve 
and indeed mask considerations of policy.”347 Indeed, Justice Breyer 
                                                                                                                      
343 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
344 Id. at 2358. 
345 See id. at 2358–59. 
346 Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Blumrosen, supra note 310, at 1042 (“Psychologi-
cal forces cannot be measured by the same calculus used for physical mechanical forces.”); 
Rutherglen, supra note 191, at 61 (“Mixed motive cases concern reasons for action, which, 
if they are causes at all, are very special causes. They do not resemble the physical causes 
that are familiar from tort law; they are not concerned with physiological mechanisms, but 
with mental processes.”). 
347 Brodin, supra note 310, at 312. 
344 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:279 
went on to suggest two policy considerations in favor of burden-shifting 
on a same-decision defense.348
 First, Justice Breyer observed that when the issue is whether the 
employer would have made the same decision absent the invidious mo-
tive, information asymmetry justifies placing the burden of proof on 
the employer: 
[T]o apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a hypothetical 
inquiry about what would have happened if the employer’s 
thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The 
answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from ob-
vious, and, since the employee likely knows less than does the 
employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, 
the employer will often be in a stronger position than the 
employee to provide the answer.349
Here, Justice Breyer’s Gross dissent mirrors Justice O’Connor’s reason-
ing in Price Waterhouse, where she too relied on the notion of asymmet-
ric information to support burden-shifting. 350  Interestingly, Justice 
O’Connor, like the majority in Gross, relied on her perception of the 
challenges of adjudicating employment discrimination claims; but, 
where the Gross Court perceived the challenge as arising from difficul-
ties in giving a burden-shifting instruction, Justice O’Connor identified 
the challenge as one discrimination plaintiffs face: 
[T]here is mounting evidence in the decisions of the lower 
courts that [Hopkins] is not alone in her inability to pinpoint 
discrimination as the precise cause of her injury, despite hav-
ing shown that it played a significant role in the decisional 
process. Many of these courts, which deal with the evidentiary 
issues in Title VII cases on a regular basis, have concluded that 
placing the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant in a situa-
tion where uncertainty as to causation has been created by its 
consideration of an illegitimate criterion makes sense as a rule 
of evidence and furthers the substantive command of Title 
VII. Particularly in the context of the professional world, 
where decisions are often made by collegial bodies on the ba-
                                                                                                                      
348 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
349 Id.; see also Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 Hastings L.J. 643, 
655 (2008) (“[V]irtually all of the evidence required to prove ‘but for’ causation is under 
the control of the defendant—often in the head of the decision-maker.”). 
350 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 273 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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sis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the plaintiff to prove 
that any one factor was the definitive cause of the decision-
makers’ action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII in-
applicable to such decisions.351
 Second, Justice Breyer suggests (although less explicitly) that it is 
fair to give the employer a same-decision defense so as not to give a 
windfall to the plaintiff.352 Once the plaintiff has shown that discrimi-
nation was a motivating factor, 
the law need not automatically assess liability in these circum-
stances. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality recognized an af-
firmative defense where the defendant could show that the 
employee would have been dismissed regardless. The law 
permits the employer this defense, not because the forbidden 
motive, age, had no role in the actual decision, but because 
the employer can show that he would have dismissed the em-
ployee anyway in the hypothetical circumstance in which his 
age-related motive was absent.353
Although Justice Breyer did not spell it out, this passage suggests a ref-
erence to the reasoning laid out in Mt. Healthy: 
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected 
conduct played a part, “substantial” or otherwise, in a decision 
not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as 
a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct 
than he would have occupied had he done nothing. . . . The 
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if 
such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he 
had not engaged in the conduct.354
 Thus, in his dissent, Justice Breyer touched on one of the key ra-
tionales for adopting burden-shifting—information asymmetry—and 
also adverted to one of the Court’s stated reasons for allowing a same-
decision defense—avoiding windfalls to the plaintiff. On the latter 
point, a number of commentators have argued that the Price Waterhouse 
Court should have distinguished Mt. Healthy rather than importing its 
                                                                                                                      
351 Id. (citation omitted). 
352 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2359 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
353 Id. 
354 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285–86. 
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same-decision defense into Price Waterhouse as a defense to liability.355 To 
the extent that Mt. Healthy crafted the same-decision defense as a de-
fense to liability (rather than merely a limit on damages),356 the Court 
based its holding in part on the concern that marginal employees 
might decide to engage in protected speech strategically, in order to 
manufacture potential retaliation claims in case they are fired. But a 
discrimination plaintiff cannot be suspected of gaming the system in 
the same way, because being a member of a protected class is not a mat-
ter of choice.357 That critique, however, is better left for discussion in 
Part II.C., which considers alternatives to the binary choice between the 
position the Court took in Gross and that taken in Price Waterhouse. 
 As the majority and dissenting opinions in Gross indicate, the ques-
tion was not whether burden-shifting should occur at the remedy stage 
or the liability stage, but instead whether it should occur at all.358 If the 
choice is simply between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining in-
struction, one might wonder how much is at stake: after all, both ap-
proaches ultimately concern but-for causation. And as some justices 
suggested during the oral argument in Gross, it is unclear what differ-
ence, if any, the choice of a burden-retaining versus a burden-shifting 
                                                                                                                      
355 See, e.g., Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from Employ-
ment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 1, 73 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he enact-
ment of Title VII strongly suggests Congressional dissatisfaction with the Court’s treatment 
of race and sex discrimination, at least in the employment context[,]” and suggesting that 
“Congress must have enacted Title VII to accomplish something more than the Court had 
accomplished through traditional equal protection analysis”). 
356 This clearly seems to be the case under the Court’s decision in Texas v. Lesage, which 
cited Mt. Healthy for the proposition that “where a plaintiff challenges a discrete govern-
mental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the 
government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury 
warranting [retrospective damages] relief under § 1983.” 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999). Some 
commentators, however, have criticized this conclusion. See generally Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. 
Healthy and Causation-In-Fact: The Court Still Doesn’t Get It!, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 603 (2000) 
(arguing that Lesage is in tension with Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)). 
357 Admittedly, the gaming-the-system rationale might be argued to apply to one par-
ticular subset of employment discrimination claims: A dishonest employee, realizing that 
he or she might be fired, might make a discrimination complaint as a way to lay the 
groundwork for a retaliation claim. But such a concern seems much less plausible than the 
concern about government employees strategically engaging in protected speech, because 
in order to have a viable retaliation claim under Title VII based on retaliation for informal 
complaints, the complaints “must be based on a ‘reasonable’ and good faith belief that the 
practice identified is a violation of Title VII.” George, supra note 183, at 449. (Protection 
against retaliation for participating in a formal EEOC charge or ensuing formal processes 
is broader.) See id. at 446–48. Moreover, against the possible concern over strategic behav-
ior one should weigh the important systemic goals served by permitting (and facilitating) 
retaliation claims. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 59–60 (2005). 
358 See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348, 2357, 2359. 
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instruction makes to the jury.359 Perhaps jurors are relatively impervi-
ous to the choice of instruction: the “story model” of juror decision 
making suggests that the jurors will decide the case by constructing 
narratives that may have little to do with the specifics of the instructions 
in the case.360 Moreover, even if jurors are careful to follow instructions 
concerning the burden of proof, logic would indicate that the choice 
between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining instruction would 
make a difference only when the evidence on but-for causation is in 
equipoise. It is, however, also possible that the choice between the two 
burden frameworks is more significant than such an analysis would 
suggest. For example, the instructions may affect the decision-making 
process by framing the jurors’ analysis of the relevant events.361 More-
over, the range of cases affected by burden-shifting would be greater to 
the extent that either “the zone of evidential ties is broader and fuzzier 
than point probabilities would suggest”362 or jurors perceive the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard to require a probability of signifi-
cantly more than fifty-one percent.363
                                                                                                                      
359 As Justice Souter put it: 
[I]sn’t it likely that the jury, regardless of instruction, is going to say some-
thing like this: If we find that—that age really was in the boss’s mind when he 
fired the person, and the boss comes in, regardless of the instructions, and 
says the guy’s work was no good, he got late—he arrived late and so on, the 
jury is going to say: Did they really fire him because he was old or because he 
didn’t come to work on time? They are going to do the same thing that they 
are going to do on the burden-shifting instruction, probably, aren’t they? 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at *25–26; see also id. at *27 ( Justice Souter: 
“[I]f you said to the jury, do the right thing, they’d probably come out the same way it 
would come out if you gave the burden shifting instruction, I think.”). 
360 See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: 
The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 521 (1991) (“The Story Model is based on the 
hypothesis that jurors impose a narrative story organization on trial information.”); id. at 
530 (suggesting that jurors will reach a decision by “matching the accepted story with each 
of the verdict definitions” provided in jury instructions). 
361 See Richard H. Field et al., Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course 
1311 (9th ed. 2007) (“[H]ow the law frames a question—whether the plaintiff or the de-
fendant bears the risk of nonpersuasion of a fact—matters. The plaintiff may start from 
‘zero,’ or the defendant may. An anchoring heuristic lowers the likelihood of the fact-
finders determining that the burdened party has prevailed, because people fail to adjust 
fully from even an arbitrarily set starting point.”). 
362 Id. at 1311–12 (“The factfinder will consider a range of showings indeterminate, 
not just perfect ties. Thus, the fact-finder will have to rely on the burden of persuasion 
more often than you would imagine.”). 
363 See George Rutherglen, supra note 191, at 68 (“Empirical studies have found that 
juries interpret proof by a preponderance of the evidence to require more than simply a 
bare preponderance of mathematical probabilities.”). 
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 It would, of course, be helpful to have empirical data on these 
questions, but they are difficult to come by. A natural experiment of 
sorts may have been provided by the measure adopted in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s model jury instructions, 
which advise a judge who cannot decide whether to give a determina-
tive-factor or motivating-factor instruction to send both questions to the 
jury in the form of written questions.364 We might attempt to measure 
the difference made by burden-shifting instructions by examining the 
frequency with which juries respond to this form by finding that: (1) 
the plaintiff has not proven that bias was the determinative factor, but 
(2) the plaintiff has proven that bias was a motivating factor, and (3) 
the defendant has not proven that it would have made the same deci-
sion anyway. Such information would add to the meager store of 
knowledge on the question, but it would not come close to settling the 
issue: even if this form is used frequently enough to yield a large sample 
of cases,365 it is questionable whether studying those results would tell 
us much about the effects of using either a burden-shifting or a burden-
retaining instruction, but not both at once. The use of a special verdict 
form, in itself, might alter the dynamics of jury decision making, and so 
might the specification of two different proof standards in the same set 
of questions. 
 Another approach might be to compare outcomes in cases where a 
burden-shifting instruction is given with cases where a burden-retaining 
instruction is given; but there would be obvious difficulties in trying to 
ensure that such an approach compared like cases. Still another ap-
proach might be to vary the burden instructions given to mock juries, 
but no one has yet undertaken such studies with respect to burden-
shifting and burden-retaining instructions in discrimination litigation. 
 Even absent such data, it seems fair to assume that when the 
choice between a burden-shifting and a burden-retaining instruction 
makes a difference, most of the time that difference works in the plain-
tiff’s favor. On that assumption, when assessing the two approaches, 
one might regard the choice between them as a means of calibrating 
the outcomes of discrimination litigation. Admittedly, if one wishes to 
calibrate outcomes, the choice of burden-retaining or burden-shifting 
jury instructions might seem like a rather weak tool. In discrimination 
litigation, as in all litigation, only a tiny fraction of cases actually reach 
                                                                                                                      
364 See 8th Cir. Civil Jury Instr. § 5.92 (2008). For a discussion of these instructions, 
see supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text. 
365 Although the Eighth Circuit has approved the use of this form, it is unclear how of-
ten it has been employed. 
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trial. Other measures—affecting gatekeeping by district judges earlier 
in the process—may be considerably more powerful.366 On the other 
hand, trials, although rare, are more frequent—and jury trials in par-
ticular are more common—in employment discrimination litigation 
than in most other types of litigation.367 Moreover, settlement outcomes 
are likely to reflect expectations concerning trial outcomes. It is also 
possible that the choice of burden framework would have effects at the 
summary judgment stage. Thus, it would be plausible to regard a 
choice between burden frameworks as a means for calibrating the level 
and success of discrimination litigation. 
 If that is the case, then one might wish to know something about 
how employment discrimination litigation currently plays out in federal 
court. Is there a problem of overclaiming or underclaiming?368 Are dis-
crimination trials too easy (or too hard) to win? On these broader ques-
tions, we do possess some relevant data.369 It is certainly the case that 
the number of employment discrimination cases in federal court rose 
dramatically during the 1990s, and although the numbers of such cases 
in federal court have fallen since 1998 they still constitute a significant 
portion of the federal civil docket.370 But do these numbers indicate an 
                                                                                                                      
 
366 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The 
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 
522 (2010). 
367 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 123 display 9 (“[T]he fraction of cases 
resolved by trial is comparatively higher for employment discrimination cases, as the frac-
tion of cases resolved by trial has fallen from 18.2% in 1979 to 2.8% in 2006 for employ-
ment discrimination cases, but from 6.2% in 1979 to the even lower level of 1.0% in 2006 
for other cases.”); id. at 126 (“[I]n 1979, only about one in ten trials was a jury trial; by 
2006, jury trials were about nine in ten. Compared to other plaintiffs, jobs plaintiffs prefer 
jury trial to judge trial.”). 
368 In a well-known 1991 article, John Donohue and Peter Siegelman argued that 
the vast preponderance of the rise in litigation [from 1970 to 1989] has come 
from allegations of discriminatory firing. Such suits actually provide employ-
ers with a disincentive—perhaps even a net disincentive—to hire minorities 
and women. Thus, we would expect less of an improvement per suit now than 
in the earlier phase. 
John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983, 1032–33 (1991). To the extent that such an argument 
could ground a proposal for retrenchment in discrimination law, Congress appears to have 
taken a different view when, that same year, it codified the statutory burden-shifting 
framework for Title VII discrimination claims. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
369 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 116, 117, 127. 
370 See id. at 116 (reporting that during the 1990s “employment discrimination cases 
exploded from 8,303 cases terminated in 1991 to 23,722 cases terminated in 1998”); id. at 
117 (noting that “the employment discrimination category has dropped in absolute num-
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onslaught of claims that require deterrence through a more demand-
ing burden of proof? The low overall win rates in employment dis-
crimination litigation suggest not.371 Moreover, developments in plead-
ing requirements, summary judgment standards, and expert testimony 
doctrine over the past thirty years have augmented the district judge’s 
authority to reject claims of civil rights violations and employment dis-
crimination.372
 Because most cases settle, it is important to take account of settle-
ment outcomes. Analyzing “an anonymously coded dataset of 1,170 
cases settled by federal magistrate judges in Chicago over a six-year pe-
riod ending in 2005,” Minna Kotkin has concluded that “there are very 
few settlements which are so low that it could be presumed that the 
case is frivolous,” and that “most settlements show a reasonable degree 
of plaintiff success.”373 Specifically, leaving aside class actions and cases 
                                                                                                                      
ber of terminations every year after 1998,” that in 2001 “employment discrimination cases 
constituted nearly ten percent of federal civil terminations” and that in 2006 such cases 
“accounted for fewer than six percent of federal civil terminations”). 
371 Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab report that “[t]he most significant observation 
about the district courts’ adjudication of employment discrimination cases is the long-run 
lack of success for these plaintiffs relative to other plaintiffs. Over the period of 1979–2006 
in federal court, the plaintiff win rate for jobs cases (15%) was much lower than that for 
non-jobs cases (51%).” Id. at 127. 
372 See Schneider, supra note 366, at 527–55 (documenting these developments); see 
also Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 128 (arguing that “the difference in win rates 
between jobs cases and non-jobs cases shows that pretrial adjudication particularly disfa-
vors employment discrimination plaintiffs”); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: 
A Windfall for Defendants, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 101, 102 (1999) (arguing, based 
on a “review of every appellate decision and many of the district court cases decided since 
the ADA became effective in 1992,” that summary judgment is granted with undue fre-
quency in ADA cases because “district courts are refusing to send ‘normative’ factual ques-
tions to the jury, such as issues of whether an individual has a ‘disability’” and because 
courts are “creating an impossibly high threshold of proof for defeating a summary judg-
ment motion”). 
Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have reviewed “the various doctrines that obli-
gate employees to promptly challenge and report violations of Title VII rights.” Deborah L. 
Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. 
Rev. 859, 864 (2008). They argue that doctrines such as “the statute of limitations, the 
definition of the acts that trigger the limitations period, equitable tolling and discovery 
rules, the special rules for reporting and challenging sexual harassment, and the role of 
internal employer procedures in the timing requirements for formally asserting Title VII 
rights” tend to “close off substantive protections from employees who do not match the 
law’s ideal.” Id. at 864–65. 
373 Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential Employment Dis-
crimination Settlements, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 111, 111, 117 (2007). 
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involving multiple plaintiffs, Kotkin found that the mean settlement 
was approximately $54,000 and the median settlement was $30,000.374
 Interestingly, win rates at trial show less of an overall difference 
between employment discrimination cases and other types of cases in 
recent years than in the 1980s.375 The reason for the convergence ap-
pears to be that in recent years more employment discrimination cases 
are tried to juries than to judges and that the set of such cases tried to 
juries has a higher plaintiff win rate than the set of such cases tried to 
judges.376 Even so, the plaintiff win rate in employment discrimination 
jury trials has remained generally below the plaintiff win rate in other 
types of jury trials and has almost always remained below fifty per-
cent.377 Although the win rate at trial is obviously affected by the mix of 
cases that reach trial, it seems fair to say that neither judges nor juries 
appear to be reflexively ruling in favor of plaintiffs in employment dis-
crimination cases. 
 At a more fine-grained level, one might consider the challenges 
those seeking to prove employment discrimination face. A number of 
commentators have observed that as discrimination becomes less and 
less overt, the difficulty of proving a discrimination claim increases.378 
As Linda Krieger has argued, “[t]he conscious, deliberate desire to ex-
clude women and minorities from the workforce has largely disap-
peared, but forms of intergroup bias stemming from social categoriza-
tion and the cognitive distortions which inexorably flow from it re-
                                                                                                                      
374 See id. at 139, 144. Noting the low plaintiff win rates at trial in discrimination cases, 
Kotkin posits “that the departure from the expected 50% trial success rate is explained by 
employers’ interest in not being labeled a discriminator, not by weak plaintiff claims.” Id. at 
117. 
375 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 211, at 129 display 15. 
376 See id. at 129–30. 
377 See id. at 130 display 16. Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner studied employment 
discrimination cases that were decided in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York from April 1, 1997 to July 31, 2001. They report that “of the 3,000 discrimina-
tion cases filed during a four-and-one-quarter-year period, only 125 cases (3.8% of the 
total) were tried to conclusion, 115 by juries, 10 by judges.” Michael Delikat & Morris M. 
Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate 
Their Rights?, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 56, 56 (2003). They state that “employment discrimination 
plaintiffs prevailed in about one-third of the trials (33.6%) while the employers prevailed 
in the rest.” Id. at 57. 
378 See, e.g., Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 368, at 1032 (“[T]he flagrant and obvi-
ous violations of the pre-Title VII era—systematic refusal to hire women or minorities for 
certain jobs, gross disparities in pay for identical jobs, segregated work place facilities–were 
much more likely to produce plaintiff victories than the subtler and less-frequent forms of 
discrimination practiced today.”). 
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main.”379 Krieger points out that when these cognitive forms of inter-
group bias contribute to an employment decision, there may well be 
evidence of another, seemingly legitimate, reason for the decision, and 
there may not be direct evidence of the invidious reason.380 Others 
have pointed out that even the seemingly neutral reason for the em-
ployment action might, upon closer examination, turn out to be the 
product of perceptions, recollections, and assessments that themselves 
are affected by bias.381 Marshalling proof of these subtler forms of bias 
is challenging. 
 More broadly, one can see that victims of discrimination face dis-
incentives to bring a claim and that those who do bring claims must 
surmount significant structural obstacles. 382  Deborah Brake reports 
studies showing “general reluctance on the part of women and persons 
of color to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination, notwith-
standing evidence that discrimination has occurred.”383 Brake also re-
ports studies suggesting that women or people of color who challenge 
discrimination may face social stigma for doing so.384 Retaliation for 
discrimination claims appears to be common.385 Although Title VII and 
other statutes prohibit retaliation against those who bring forward dis-
crimination claims, doctrinal limits circumscribe the availability of such 
retaliation claims.386
                                                                                                                      
 
379 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 1241 (1995). Judith 
Olans Brown, Stephen Subrin, and Phyllis Tropper Baumann have argued that the same 
sorts of biases can affect jury decision making. See Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts 
About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Reopening the 
Judicial Dialogue, 46 Emory L.J. 1487, 1508 (1997) (proposing that “the trial judge caution 
jurors about unconscious cognitive stereotyping by pointing out the human tendency to 
see life and evaluate evidence through a clouded filter that favors those like themselves”). 
380 Krieger, supra note 379, at 1223–24. 
381 See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of 
Power, 41 Hastings L.J. 471, 527 (1990) (arguing that when the assertedly legitimate rea-
son for the action is based on a subjective judgment, that reason may itself be the product 
of stereotypes). But see Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of Mixed 
Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1029, 1063 (criticizing 
Radford for “carv[ing] out for protection so-called objective standards that were designed 
with working men, not women, in mind”). 
382 See Brake, supra note 357. 
383 Id. at 26. 
384 See id. at 32–36. 
385 See id. at 38 n.59. 
386 On the other hand, Glenn George posits that plaintiffs may have better chances of 
winning on a retaliation claim than on the underlying discrimination claim: 
[I]n a typical discrimination trial, where the jury is often presented with evi-
dence of both discrimination and employee performance problems allegedly 
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 In short, the data on employment discrimination litigation gener-
ally do not appear to demonstrate that Price Waterhouse should be re-
jected in order to deter claims or to make it more difficult for plaintiffs 
to prevail. What of ADEA claims in particular? George Rutherglen, ana-
lyzing data from an American Bar Foundation survey of some 1250 
employment discrimination cases in seven cities from 1972 to 1987, 
found that ADEA cases were settled at a higher rate (57.9%) than non-
ADEA cases (46.5%), that the defendant won at various stages in 26.3% 
of ADEA cases compared with 47% of non-ADEA cases, and that plain-
tiffs won at trial in 6.3% of ADEA cases compared with 2.2% of non-
ADEA cases.387 Rutherglen concluded that “claims under the ADEA are 
brought predominantly by white males who hold relatively high-status 
and high-paying jobs” and that such claims “mainly allege discrimina-
tory discharge and result in recovery of money judgments several times 
higher than other claims of employment discrimination.”388 Arguing 
that “claims under the ADEA more closely resemble claims for wrong-
ful discharge than other claims of employment discrimination,” 
Rutherglen asserted that “the ADEA cannot be justified, either doctri-
nally or empirically, because it protects a disfavored and relatively pow-
erless minority group from discrimination.”389 Michael Selmi has sug-
gested that 
treating all discrimination cases equally can lead to a doctrinal 
mismatch; age cases have largely borrowed the proof structure 
from Title VII, even though the prima facie case in an age dis-
crimination case is likely to offer less probative value than is 
                                                                                                                      
justifying the employer’s adverse action, a juror may be slower to find a dis-
criminatory motive because he or she would be reluctant to evaluate their 
own actions through that lens. When presented with evidence of a retaliatory 
motive, however, a juror may more readily identify with the employer’s al-
leged resentment if the employer feels he was wrongly accused of discriminat-
ing against the plaintiff. Because the juror can more easily project his or her 
own revenge or retaliation instinct in a similar situation, he or she may more 
easily conclude that retaliation played a role in the adverse decision made. 
George, supra note 183, at 469. 
However, Wendy Parker’s analysis of 467 opinions in employment discrimination cases 
did not find that plaintiffs claiming retaliation had higher success rates. See Wendy Parker, 
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 889, 918 
(2006). Though this study was limited to opinions available on Westlaw, and thus may not 
reflect the mix of results in all cases, the finding is nonetheless suggestive. 
387 See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimi-
nation Law, 24 J. Legal Stud. 491, 504–05, 504 n.67, 512 tbl. 6 (1995). 
388 Id. at 491. 
389 Id. 
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true in a race discrimination case because of the different his-
tories our country has experienced with respect to race and 
age discrimination.390
It is possible that some such concern factored into the justices’ delib-
erations. At oral argument, for example, Justice Alito asked: “[I]sn’t age 
more closely correlated with legitimate reasons for employment dis-
crimination than race and other factors that are proscribed by Title 
VII?”391
 Perhaps, then, intuitions that ADEA cases are distinctive animated 
some justices’ views of the issue in Gross. That possibility might support 
an argument that Gross should not apply to other types of discrimina-
tion claims. It is worth noting, however, that other studies suggest a dif-
ferent view of age claims. David Oppenheimer, reporting on a study 
that “examined every California employment law jury verdict reported 
in one or more of the state’s three major jury verdict reporters for the 
years 1998 and 1999,” found that “women alleging age discrimination 
lost every case they tried, while men alleging age discrimination won 
36% of the time.”392 Oppenheimer’s study may have included age dis-
crimination claims under California state law as well as under the 
ADEA, and the jury verdict reporter data are not comprehensive.393 
Nonetheless, these figures suggest that in age discrimination cases, as in 
employment discrimination claims more generally, juries are not reflex-
ively finding in favor of plaintiffs. Wendy Parker examined cases filed in 
2002 in the U.S. District Courts for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and the Northern District of Texas, including 192 cases involving race 
or national origin discrimination claims, 172 cases involving gender 
discrimination claims, and 109 cases involving age discrimination 
claims.394 Defendants won pretrial judgments in 17% of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania age discrimination cases and 22% of the 
Northern District of Texas age discrimination cases.395 By comparison, 
                                                                                                                      
390 Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 La. L. 
Rev. 555, 565 (2001). 
391 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 108, at *47. 
392 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Em-
ployment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women 
and Minorities, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 511, 515–16, 549 (2003). 
393 See id. at 550–51 (arguing that reporting bias may skew jury verdict reporter data 
because plaintiff wins may be more likely to be reported than defendant wins). 
394 Parker, supra note 386, at 904–05, 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4. It appears that national 
origin claims were coded as race claims, so Professor Parker treats the two together as 
“race discrimination” claims. See id. at 904 & n.70. 
395 Id. at 954 tbl. A6. 
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defendants won pretrial judgments in 6% of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania gender discrimination cases, 14% of the Northern District 
of Texas gender discrimination cases, 7% of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania race discrimination cases, and 26% of the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas race discrimination cases.396 Age discrimination cases set-
tled at a rate of 78% in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and 53% in 
the Northern District of Texas.397 Settlement rates were 78% for East-
ern District of Pennsylvania race claims, 58% for Northern District of 
Texas race claims, 87% for Eastern District of Pennsylvania gender 
claims, and 72% for Northern District of Texas gender claims.398 From 
these data, Parker concludes that “[a]ge discrimination cases appear to 
be much harder to win (and settle) than previously proposed.”399
C. Reorienting Employment Litigation 
 Part II.B. argued that the data on discrimination litigation do not 
appear to justify the ruling in Gross as a means of recalibrating levels of 
claiming or litigation outcomes.400 In making that argument, Part II.B. 
focused on the choice discussed by the majority and the dissents in 
Gross—namely, the choice between a burden-retaining and a burden-
shifting approach to liability. It is important to note the constrained na-
ture of that analysis. This Part steps further back to note the possibility 
of a more significant overhaul of the current system.401 Part II.B was es-
sentially conservative in its focus; it argued that the data on employment 
discrimination litigation do not appear to indicate a reason to switch 
from the Price Waterhouse framework to a unitary burden-retaining 
framework. This Part notes that arguments could, instead, be made for 
                                                                                                                      
396 Id. at 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4, 953 tbl. A5. 
397 Id. at 954 tbl. A6. 
398 Id. at 949 tbl. A3, 951 tbl. A4, 953 tbl. A5. 
399 Id. at 930. Parker indicates that two Eastern District of Pennsylvania age cases were 
disposed of by jury verdicts for plaintiffs; she does not list any Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania age discrimination jury verdicts for defendants, and apparently the sample included 
no Eastern District of Pennsylvania bench trials on age discrimination claims. See id. at 954 
tbl. A6. Parker indicates that one Northern District of Texas age case was disposed of by a 
ruling for the defendant after a bench trial; she does not list any Northern District of 
Texas age discrimination rulings for the plaintiff after a bench trial, and apparently the 
sample included no Northern District of Texas jury trials on age discrimination claims. See 
id. 
400 See supra notes 343–399 and accompanying text; see also Katz, supra note 16, at 890 
(arguing that Gross “provides a windfall to defendants, fails to punish discriminators, un-
der-deters discrimination, and places an undue burden of proof on plaintiffs”). 
401 See infra notes 400–427 and accompanying text. 
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moving in the opposite direction—in other words, for extending the 
statutory burden-shifting mechanism to claims beyond Title VII.402
 Price Waterhouse, after all, has long been criticized by some as too 
favorable to defendants.403  As Reginald Govan recalls, “[c]ivil rights 
advocates initially hailed [Price Waterhouse] . . . as a great victory,” but 
opinion later shifted: 
Civil rights advocates immediately embraced these new bur-
den-shifting rules. Only later did they focus on that part of the 
Court’s holding that completely absolved employers of liabil-
ity upon proof that their decision was predicated on permissi-
ble as well as impermissible factors. Thereafter, civil rights ad-
vocates contended that Price Waterhouse let employers escape 
                                                                                                                      
402 When considering legislation to make burden frameworks consistent, Congress 
might also study possibilities for adjusting the choices made in Title VII’s statutory burden-
shifting framework. William Corbett has observed that the statutory framework’s “limita-
tion on remedies is substantial, leaving the plaintiff without any money (except possibly 
attorneys’ fees) if the defendant prevails on same decision.” William R. Corbett, Fixing 
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. Rev. 81, 107 (2009). And as others have ob-
served, “courts usually have refused to award attorney fees to the employee when the em-
ployer proves that it would have made the same employment decision absent the discrimi-
natory motive and when injunctive relief is not necessary.” Thomas H. Barnard & George 
S. Crisci, “Mixed-Motive” Discrimination Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Still a “Pyrrhic Vic-
tory” for Plaintiffs?, 51 Mercer L. Rev. 673, 674 (2000). Corbett suggests that “Congress 
could reduce the remedy limitation, making it possible for a plaintiff to recover a mone-
tary remedy,” through either of two possible means: “1) the same-decision defense cuts off 
compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief of reinstatement (instatement, 
promotion, etc.) and front pay, but not backpay; or 2) the same-decision defense cuts off 
punitive damages and injunctive relief such as reinstatement, but not backpay and com-
pensatory damages.” Corbett, supra, at 108. Corbett advocates the second option “because 
the remedy for disparate treatment should provide relief for lost wages and compensation 
for emotional distress injuries that makes the plaintiff whole.” Id. Martin Katz has also 
proposed adjustments in the statutory remedial framework. He argues that “the proce-
dural-and-substantive two-tier approach used in current doctrine should be modified to 
include meaningful punitive and deterrent sanctions at the ‘motivating factor’ level of 
causation[,]” and that “the two-tier approach used in current doctrine should be modified 
to include meaningful incentives for plaintiffs and their attorneys to act as private attor-
neys general in over-determined/‘same action’ cases.” Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental 
Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 489, 
539–40 (2006). Linda Krieger has suggested that “cognitive bias-based disparate treatment” 
should be explicitly recognized as actionable, but should not result in compensatory or 
punitive damages. Krieger, supra note 379, at 1243–44. An assessment of the merits of these 
proposals lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
403 See, e.g., Govan, supra note 44, at 17–18; Hart, supra note 176, at 759. 
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liability for “overt sexism or racism . . . as long as it was not 
the only thing on the employer’s mind.”404
 The notion of “mixed motives” is useful because it evokes a more 
realistic understanding of how discrimination occurs.405 But critics of 
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting take issue with the notion that the 
mixed-motive framework should include the same-decision defense as a 
defense to liability.406 Many such commentators argue that once a dis-
crimination plaintiff shows that the invidious motive was a motivating 
factor in the challenged decision, liability should be taken as estab-
lished and the same-decision defense should only affect the question of 
remedies.407 In this view, the presence of a discriminatory motive trig-
gers the deterrent function of employment discrimination law.408 The 
wish to avoid a windfall to the plaintiff is relevant only to the law’s com-
pensatory goal and not the public interest in deterring discrimina-
tion.409 Even if the employer’s discriminatory motivation did not make 
a difference to the outcome in that particular instance, it affects the 
workplace in ways that may increase the likelihood of future discrimina-
tory acts. Furthermore, an employee subjected to an employment deci-
sion in part based upon discriminatory reasons suffers a dignitary harm 
even if the employment action would have been taken anyway.410
                                                                                                                      
 
404 Govan, supra note 44, at 17–18 (citation omitted); see also Hart, supra note 176, at 
759 (“The mixed motive claim [as defined in Price Waterhouse] was, at best, a mixed bless-
ing for plaintiffs. On the one hand, it went a step toward eliminating the notion that an 
employee has been discriminated against only if race or gender was the exclusive motiva-
tor for the decision. On the other hand, an employer could use discriminatory factors in 
the decision-making process but still avoid any liability if it could show that it would have 
made the same decision anyway.”). 
405 See Hart, supra note 176, at 760 (“[M]ost of the significant psychological models for 
racism today suggest that discrimination most often occurs when the decisionmaker can 
justify the decision in some other way.”); Krieger, supra note 379, at 1223 (“Mixed-motives 
theory reflects much more accurately than pretext theory the processes by which cognitive 
sources of bias result in intergroup discrimination.”). 
406 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658. 
407 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658. 
408 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 317; Katz, supra note 349, at 658. 
409 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 319–20 (arguing that “Congress has relied primarily 
on private litigants for the judicial enforcement of title VII, thus imbuing these private 
actions with a social function unaddressed by the Mt. Healthy theory of causality”) (citation 
omitted). Martin Katz has argued that when a defendant was motivated by bias but there 
was also a non-discriminatory and sufficient reason for the employment action, the prob-
lem of windfalls can best be dealt with “by splitting this windfall between the two parties” 
according to a sort of “comparative fault rule.” Katz, supra note 402, at 545. 
410 See Blumrosen, supra note 310, at 1040 (“Discrimination has both economic and 
dignitary aspects. The ‘same decision’ rule confines title VII to protection of economic 
interests and in effect casts out many employees from its protection.”); Brodin, supra note 
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 The 1991 Act responded to such concerns, in the field of Title VII 
claims, by crafting the statutory burden-shifting mechanism so that the 
same-decision defense goes only to remedies and not to liability.411 A 
number of commentators argue that the statutory burden-shifting me-
chanism, for this reason, better implements anti-discrimination princi-
ples.412 Such commentators advocate the extension of that approach to 
other employment discrimination claims.413 Such an extension would 
carry the significant advantage of rendering the approach to burden 
frameworks consistent across different types of claims. Consistency 
would be particularly valuable because, as Part I.B.4 illustrated, a sig-
nificant number of trials involve more than one type of claim.414
                                                                                                                      
310, at 318–19 (“Since the stigmatization that discrimination based on an immutable char-
acteristic inflicts on a person occurs when that characteristic operates as a motivating fac-
tor, should not title VII provide the victim with some relief at that point?”) (citation omit-
ted). 
411 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), (b), §§ 703(m), 706(g). 
412 Mark Brodin, writing almost a decade before the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act, suggested a somewhat similar mechanism. See Brodin, supra note 310, at 323 (propos-
ing a system under which “[a] plaintiff who establishes that a prohibited criterion was a 
motivating factor in the challenged decision thereby establishes a violation of the Act and 
thus the defendant’s liability. The same-decision test would then be applied only to deter-
mine the appropriate remedy.”) (citation omitted). Melissa Hart has argued that Title VII’s 
two-tiered remedial structure “may further aid efforts to challenge unconscious discrimi-
nation by creating a middle ground that will make courts comfortable with acknowledging 
the role that discrimination can play even in cases where employers can otherwise justify 
their decisions.” Hart, supra note 176, at 762. 
413 See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 402, at 109 (suggesting modifications to the statutory 
burden-shifting framework and arguing that “Congress should . . . expressly provid[e] 
that the one new proof structure applies to disparate treatment claims under Title VII, 
Section 1981, the ADEA, and the ADA”); Katz, supra note 349, at 659; Jamie Darin Pren-
kert, The Role of Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas’s 
Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 511, 560–62 (2008) (arguing that 
Congress should “add the 703(m) language to the other statutes and the corresponding 
anti-retaliation provisions,” “clarify[] the availability and character of the same-decision 
defense,” and “incorporate the Desert Palace ruling into the other statutes”); Michael J. 
Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 
Ga. L. Rev. 563, 625–26 & n.202 (1996). 
Even absent legislation explicitly extending the statutory burden-shifting framework to 
§ 1981, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the same-decision defense goes only to 
remedies, not to liability, on § 1981 discrimination claims (though it also concluded that 
the same-decision defense goes to liability on § 1981 retaliation claims). See Metoyer v. 
Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 2007). By contrast, in an unpublished decision a 
Sixth Circuit panel—without citing Price Waterhouse—held a mixed-motive framework in-
applicable to a § 1981 case on the ground that § 2000e-2(m) does not apply to such 
claims. See Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F. App’x 667, 676, 2005 WL 3078627, *7 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
414 See supra notes 277–301 and accompanying text. 
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 Since the time this Article was first drafted, bills that would extend 
the statutory burden-shifting mechanism well beyond Title VII have 
been introduced in both houses of Congress. I will summarize here the 
current version of the Senate Bill; the House Bill is substantially simi-
lar.415 The bill’s findings state that “unlawful discrimination is often dif-
ficult to detect and prove because discriminators do not usually admit 
their discrimination and often try to conceal their true motives.”416 Re-
jecting the reasoning of Gross—which, as we have seen, asserted that the 
1991 amendments foreclosed burden-shifting in ADEA cases—the bill 
states that “Congress has relied on” the premise that the ADEA “and 
similar antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws . . . would be inter-
preted consistently with judicial interpretations of title VII . . . includ-
ing amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”417 Absent legis-
lation, the findings conclude, “victims of age discrimination will find it 
unduly difficult to prove their claims and victims of other types of dis-
crimination may find their rights and remedies uncertain and unpre-
dictable.”418
 The bill is designed 
to ensure that the standard for proving unlawful disparate 
treatment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 and other anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws 
is no different than the standard for making such a proof un-
der title VII . . . including amendments made by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991.419
To accomplish this goal of uniform treatment, the bill creates a proof 
framework modeled on the existing statutory framework for Title VII 
discrimination claims.420 The proof framework will apply not just to all 
ADEA claims but also to claims under any other federal law forbidding 
employment discrimination, to claims under “any provision of the Con-
stitution that protects against discrimination or retaliation,” and—with 
certain exceptions—to claims under any law “forbidding . . . retalia-
tion against an individual for engaging in, or interference with, any 
federally protected activity including the exercise of any right estab-
                                                                                                                      
415 See generally S. 1756, 111th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong., 1st. 
Sess. (2009). 
416 S. 1756, § 2(a)(2). 
417 Id. § 2(a)(3). 
418 Id. § 2(a)(6). 
419 Id. § 2(b). 
420 Id. § 3. 
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lished by Federal law (including a whistleblower law).”421 The bill ex-
cludes from the new framework anti-retaliation claims under laws that 
have “an express provision regarding a legal burden of proof.”422
 From this summary, one can see that the bill would do more than 
merely erase the effects of Gross itself. It would extend the statutory 
burden-shifting mechanism to claims—such as ADEA claims—that 
prior to Gross would likely have been governed instead by the Price Wa-
terhouse (or Mount Healthy) burden-shifting mechanism. 423  The bill’s 
statutory burden-shifting mechanism would also extend to some types 
of claims that might not have previously been subject to either Price 
Waterhouse or statutory burden-shifting. 424  The proposed statutory 
mechanism would enable a plaintiff to establish liability by proving that 
discrimination (or retaliation) was a motivating factor in the chal-
lenged action, although the defendant could limit remedies by proving 
that it would have made the same decision anyway.425 The bill would 
also clear up certain questions that have plagued burden-shifting doc-
trine. For one thing, the bill would indicate that the plaintiff can 
choose whether to proceed under a motivating-factor or determinative-
factor burden framework.426 For another, the bill would also provide— 
as Desert Palace v. Costa did for Title VII discrimination claims—that the 
plaintiff can use either circumstantial or direct evidence to establish a 
claim under either the motivating-factor or determinative-factor frame-
work.427
Conclusion 
 Although the scholarly literature abounds with criticisms of Price 
Waterhouse burden-shifting, the most common complaints have been 
that the decision did not go far enough (and should have provided for 
liability upon a finding of illicit motivation) and that the decision failed 
to provide guidance on when a burden-shifting (as opposed to a bur-
den-retaining) instruction should be used. In Gross v. FBL Financial Ser-
                                                                                                                      
421 Id. § 3 (adding new subsection (g)(5) to 29 U.S.C. § 623). 
422 S. 1756 § 3, 111th Cong., 1st. Sess. (2009) (adding new subsection (g)(6) to 29 
U.S.C. § 623). This carve-out would exclude, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 1221’s whistleblower 
provision, which sets a clear-and-convincing burden for the employer proving a same-
decision defense. See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2) (2006). 
423 See S. 1756 § 3. 
424 Examples would be EPA retaliation claims and FLSA retaliation claims. 
425 See S. 1756, § 3 (adding new subsection (g) to 29 U.S.C. § 623). 
426 See id. 
427 See id. 
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vices, Inc., the majority chose instead to move the law in the other direc-
tion and prohibit the use of burden-shifting for all ADEA discrimina-
tion claims. 
 Because lower courts had long been applying Price Waterhouse bur-
den-shifting to such claims, the holding in Gross constituted a departure 
from well-established law. The Gross majority chose to reject Price Water-
house on the basis that sound judicial administration required it to do 
so—because, the Court said, Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causes too 
much confusion. But, as Part I.B.2 argued, the strongest argument con-
cerning confusion is simply that lower courts lack guidance as to when 
a burden-shifting instruction is appropriate and when it is not. Gross 
has, admittedly, eliminated that confusion for purposes of ADEA dis-
crimination claims. But holding burden-shifting categorically inappli-
cable to such claims was not the only possible option for addressing 
such confusion. The Court could instead have extended Desert Palace v. 
Costa to non-statutory burden-shifting, holding that such burden-
shifting is available (under Price Waterhouse) whenever either direct or 
circumstantial evidence exists that discrimination was a motivating fac-
tor. The purely technical goal of eliminating doctrinal confusion does 
not suffice to determine the choice between these two options, since 
either option would accomplish that goal. If the majority’s choice be-
tween the options flowed instead from underlying views about the goals 
of the ADEA or the realities of age discrimination litigation, the major-
ity opinion might have been more persuasive—or, at the least, less puz-
zling—if it had said so.428
 While the Gross Court put an end to debates over burden-shifting 
in the ADEA context, the decision will spark litigation over the viability 
of burden-shifting for a range of other types of claims. As Part I.B.3 
notes, the availability of burden-shifting under Gross may vary from 
claim to claim because not all the rationales adduced by the Gross Court 
apply to each type of claim. In addition to those rationales, other policy 
concerns might legitimately be considered. For example, the fact that 
all of the Gross Court’s rationales apply to Title VII retaliation claims 
need not compel the conclusion that burden-shifting is unavailable for 
all such claims. A court faced with this question might consider, for ex-
ample, the vital role played by anti-retaliation provisions in ensuring 
the effective enforcement of the law. The court might also consider the 
                                                                                                                      
428 See Brodin, supra note 310, at 312–13 (“[F]ew of the published opinions dealing 
with the causation question in title VII litigation make an explicit reference to policy con-
cerns or address the fundamental question, ‘How can the policies of [this] public law best 
be served in a concrete case?’”). 
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fact that Title VII retaliation claims will often go to the jury accompa-
nied by a Title VII discrimination claim that entails a statutory burden-
shifting instruction. In short, this Article argued that—even as to claims 
to which all of the Gross rationales appear to pertain—the applicability 
of Gross should not be viewed as clear-cut. 
 Ultimately, however, it appears likely that the Court will extend 
Gross to some or all of the claims discussed in Part I.B.3. And, if it takes 
an approach similar to Gross, the Court will do so without an assessment 
of the data discussed in Part II.B. Explicit discussions of those consid-
erations are more likely to occur in legislative deliberations than in Su-
preme Court caselaw. As Part II.C notes, bills have been introduced in 
both houses of Congress that would extend statutory burden-shifting to 
all federal employment discrimination claims, to many federal anti-
retaliation claims, and to all federal constitutional discrimination or 
retaliation claims. If such legislation comes to pass, then the Supreme 
Court in Gross might ultimately achieve what commentators have not— 
namely, spurring the adoption of legislation that codifies burden-
shifting across a range of different types of claims. 
